IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-00524134.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Pauline Contou-Carrère

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Tristan Tomala

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales)

Abstract

This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00524134, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00524134
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00524134
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00524134/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
    2. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
    2. Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
    3. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013. "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 295-303, February.
    4. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
    5. Arthur Schram & Boris Van Leeuwen & Theo Offerman, 2013. "Superstars Need Social Benefits: An Experiment on Network Formation," Working Papers 1306, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jul 2013.
    6. Norman, Peter, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.
    7. Prajit K. Dutta & Paolo Siconolfi, 2010. "Mixed strategy equilibria in repeated games with one‐period memory," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 167-187, March.
    8. Sofia Moroni, 2018. "Games with Private Timing," Working Paper 6400, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    9. Conlon, John R., 1995. "Continuous time vs. backward induction a new approach to modelling reputation in the finite time horizon context," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1449-1469, November.
    10. List, John A. & Neilson, William S. & Price, Michael K., 2016. "The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 67-85.
    11. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January.
    12. Stähler, Frank, 1995. "Profits in pure Bertrand oligopolies," Kiel Working Papers 703, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    13. Jan Hendrik Preißler-Jebe, Korbinian von Blanckenburg, Alexander Geist, "undated". "Comparing Cartel Behavior: A Simulation Analysis with the System of Cartel Markers (SCM)," Working Papers 201041, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
    14. Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz, 2009. "In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 445-466, November.
    15. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 333-347, September.
    16. Ko, Young Dae, 2019. "The airfare pricing and seat allocation problem in full-service carriers and subsidiary low-cost carriers," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 92-102.
    17. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016. "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers 2016-12, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    18. Glover, Jonathan & Xue, Hao, 2023. "Accounting conservatism and relational contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).
    19. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke, 2012. "Finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments without a commonly known end," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 23-47, February.
    20. Boris van Leeuwen & Theo Offerman & Arthur Schram, 2020. "Competition for Status Creates Superstars: an Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 666-707.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00524134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.