Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
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- , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543604, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543605, HAL.
- Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543571, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543601, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543608, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543602, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543607, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543606, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2009. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00495923, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.
- Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Working Papers hal-00540799, HAL.
- Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543609, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
- Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021.
"First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition,"
TSE Working Papers
21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
- Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013.
"A folk theorem for competing mechanisms,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
- Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
- Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
- Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013.
"Network Design under Local Complementarities,"
Working Papers
halshs-00796487, HAL.
- Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," AMSE Working Papers 1309, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 12 Feb 2013.
- Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Implementation by Sortition in Nonexclusive Information Economies," Economics Working Papers 2015-13, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
- Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism Design; Communication Networks;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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