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Daily commuting

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  • Berliant, Marcus

Abstract

Workers generally commute on a daily basis, so we model commuting as a repeated game. The folk theorem implies that for sufficiently large discount factors, the repeated commuting game has as a Nash equilibrium any feasible strategy that is uniformly better than the minimax strategy payoff for a commuter in the one shot game, repeated over the infinite horizon. This includes the efficient equilibria. An example where the efficient payoffs strictly dominate the one shot Nash equilibrium payoffs is provided. Our conclusions pose a challenge to congestion pricing in that equilibrium selection could be at least as effective in improving welfare. We examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated commuting game.

Suggested Citation

  • Berliant, Marcus, 2024. "Daily commuting," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:103:y:2024:i:c:s0739885923001324
    DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2023.101392
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    1. Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 315-330, August.
    2. Berliant, Marcus, 2017. "Commuting and internet traffic congestion," MPRA Paper 77378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    1. Berliant, Marcus, 2017. "Commuting and internet traffic congestion," MPRA Paper 77378, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated game; Nash equilibrium; Commuting; Folk theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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