IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04836057.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Communication on networks and strong reliability

Author

Listed:
  • Marie Laclau

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ludovic Renou

    (QMUL - Queen Mary University of London)

  • Xavier Venel

    (LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma])

Abstract

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediator).

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Post-Print hal-04836057, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04836057
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04836057v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04836057v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8159 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
    3. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    4. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
    5. JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Repeated proximity games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.
    6. Françoise Forges, 2020. "Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 137, pages 3-30.
    7. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    8. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    9. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    10. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    11. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-358, March.
    12. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
    13. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6115 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
    16. Françoise Forges, 2020. "Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion," Post-Print hal-03537868, HAL.
    17. Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks," Post-Print hal-00464542, HAL.
    18. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    19. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    20. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    21. FORGES, Françoise, 1985. "Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 663, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    2. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
    3. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    4. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
    7. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2022. "The art of brevity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 257-271.
    8. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
    9. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    10. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-14, June.
    11. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    12. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    13. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    14. Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
    15. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    16. Dmitry Sedov, 2023. "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 505-546, September.
    17. Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
    18. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    19. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    20. Forges, Françoise & Ray, Indrajit, 2024. "“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    21. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04836057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.