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Mustafa Oguz Afacan

Personal Details

First Name:Mustafa
Middle Name:Oguz
Last Name:Afacan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:paf46
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Ekonomi Grubu
Sabancı Üniversitesi

İstanbul, Turkey
http://www.sabanciuniv.edu/ssbf/economics/
RePEc:edi:egsabtr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Mustafa Oguz Afacan & Nejat Anbarci & Ozgur Kıbrıs, 2022. "Arbiter Assignment," Working Papers 2022_02, Durham University Business School.
  2. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Turhan, Bertan, 2018. "Assignment maximization," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  3. Mustafa Oguz Afacan, 2010. "Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 09-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Articles

  1. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.
  2. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz, 2019. "A task-allocation problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 285-290.
  3. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2019. "School choice with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 57-72.
  4. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2019. "Matching with restricted trade," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 957-977, September.
  5. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
  6. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
  7. Mustafa Og̃uz Afacan & Zeynel Harun Aliog̃ulları & Mehmet Barlo, 2017. "Sticky matching in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 509-538, October.
  8. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "Incompatibility between stability and consistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 135-137.
  9. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017. "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 656-665.
  10. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Salman, Umutcan, 2016. "Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 95-97.
  11. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2016. "Characterizations of the cumulative offer process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 531-542, October.
  12. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2016. "Enrollment manipulations in school choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 119-125.
  13. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz & Turhan, Bertan, 2015. "On relationships between substitutes conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 10-12.
  14. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
  15. Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.
  16. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 176-179.
  17. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
  18. Mustafa Oguz Afacan, 2012. "On The "Group Non-bossiness" Property," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1571-1575.
  19. Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa, 2012. "Group robust stability in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 394-398.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Turhan, Bertan, 2018. "Assignment maximization," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

    Cited by:

    1. Noda, Shunya, 2023. "A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 364-379.
    2. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur, 2023. "Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 321-338, April.
    3. Kondratev, Aleksei Y. & Nesterov, Alexander S., 2022. "Minimal envy and popular matchings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 776-787.
    4. Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
    5. Haris Aziz & Florian Brandl, 2021. "Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing," Papers 2102.04384, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    6. Noda, Shunya, 2020. "Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 1-5.

  2. Mustafa Oguz Afacan, 2010. "Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 09-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Archishman Chakraborty & Alessandro Citanna & Michael Ostrovsky, 2015. "Group stability in matching with interdependent values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 3-24, March.
    2. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
    3. Feng Zhang & Liwei Zhong, 2021. "Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 928-936, November.
    4. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia‐Ling Hsu, 2023. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1064-1077, October.
    5. Chen, Yajing, 2014. "When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 43-45.
    6. Feng Zhang & Liwei Zhong, 0. "Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-9.
    7. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
    8. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia-Ling Hsu, 2021. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Papers 2104.09157, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
    9. Liwei Zhong & Yanqin Bai, 2019. "Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 286-292, January.

Articles

  1. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.

    Cited by:

    1. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," ISU General Staff Papers 202109010700001099, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Eun Jeong Heo, 2023. "Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 265-297, January.

  2. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2019. "Matching with restricted trade," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 957-977, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Pan, Lijun & Peng, Linyu & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

  3. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.

    Cited by:

    1. Haris Aziz & Bettina Klaus, 2019. "Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(2), pages 213-259, August.
    2. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian, 2022. "The vigilant eating rule: A general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 168-187.
    3. He, Yinghua & Miralles, Antonio & Pycia, Marek & Yan, Jianye, 2015. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities," TSE Working Papers 15-601, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2017.
    4. Haris Aziz & Florian Brandl, 2020. "The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints," Papers 2008.08991, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    5. Mehdi Feizi, 2023. "The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(2), pages 370-383, June.

  4. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.

    Cited by:

    1. Dur, Umut & Hammond, Robert G. & Kesten, Onur, 2021. "Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 497-516, December.
    3. Afacan, Mustafa Oguz & Evdokimov, Piotr & Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Parallel Markets in School Choice," ISU General Staff Papers 202106130700001128, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Umut Dur & Onur Kesten, 2019. "Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 251-283, September.

  5. Mustafa Og̃uz Afacan & Zeynel Harun Aliog̃ulları & Mehmet Barlo, 2017. "Sticky matching in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 509-538, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Mert Dur, 2020. "Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 477-494, October.
    2. Claudia Cerrone & Yoan Hermstrüwer & Onur Kesten, 2024. "School Choice with Consent: an Experiment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 1760-1805.
    3. Mustafa Ou{g}uz Afacan & In'acio B'o & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," Papers 2012.01011, arXiv.org.
    4. Zeky Murra-Anton, 2022. "Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 833-870, October.
    5. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2019. "School choice with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 57-72.
    6. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    7. Dur, Umut & Gitmez, A. Arda & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2019. "School choice under partial fairness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    8. Dilek Sayedahmed, 2022. "Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 71-111, December.

  6. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "Incompatibility between stability and consistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 135-137.

    Cited by:

    1. Battal Dogan & Bumin Yenmez, 2017. "Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    2. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 125-137, April.
    3. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.

  7. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2017. "Some further properties of the cumulative offer process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 656-665.

    Cited by:

    1. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," ISU General Staff Papers 202109010700001099, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Orhan Aygün & Bertan Turhan, 2023. "How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(10), pages 6147-6164, October.
    3. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "How to De-reserve Reserves," ISU General Staff Papers 202104130700001123, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2014. "College Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E24, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    5. Kasajima, Yoichi & Toda, Manabu, 2024. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 269-286.
    6. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules," Papers 2004.13261, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    7. HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2016. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 978, Boston College Department of Economics.
    9. Orhan Aygun & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Designing Direct Matching Mechanism for India with Comprehensive Affirmative Action," Papers 2004.13264, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    10. Juan F. Fung & Chia-Ling Hsu, 2021. "A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 93-109, June.

  8. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Salman, Umutcan, 2016. "Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 95-97.

    Cited by:

    1. Di Feng & Yun Liu & Gaowang Wang, 2023. "On the Asymptotic Performance of Affirmative Actions in School Choice," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 24(2), pages 289-307, November.
    2. Yun Liu, 2017. "On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 121-151, June.
    3. Yuri Faenza & Swati Gupta & Xuan Zhang, 2022. "Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets," Papers 2203.00544, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    4. Battal Dogan & Bettina Klaus, 2018. "Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.15, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    5. Domenico Moramarco & Umutcan Salman, 2023. "Equal opportunities in many-to-one matching markets," Working Papers 649, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    6. Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang, 2019. "Responsive affirmative action in school choice: A comparison study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 140-145.
    7. Umut Dur & Yifan Xie, 2023. "Responsiveness to priority‐based affirmative action policy in school choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 229-244, April.
    8. Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang, 2018. "Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 60-62.
    9. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "School Choice with Multiple Priorities," Papers 2308.04780, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    10. Eun Jeong Heo, 2023. "Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 265-297, January.
    11. Jiao, Zhenhua & Shen, Ziyang, 2020. "On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).

  9. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2016. "Characterizations of the cumulative offer process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 531-542, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Mert Dur, 2020. "Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 477-494, October.
    2. HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2016. "Supplementary Note to “On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts”," Discussion Papers 2016-14, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Okumura, Yasunori & 奥村, 保規, 2023. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respect for Improvements," Discussion Papers 2023-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2016. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

  10. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2016. "Enrollment manipulations in school choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 119-125.

    Cited by:

    1. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    2. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..

  11. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz & Turhan, Bertan, 2015. "On relationships between substitutes conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 10-12.

    Cited by:

    1. HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2016. "Supplementary Note to “On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts”," Discussion Papers 2016-14, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Hirata, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & Kasuya, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介 & Okumura, Yasunori & 奥村, 保規, 2023. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respect for Improvements," Discussion Papers 2023-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2016. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

  12. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
    2. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
    3. Thayer Morrill, 2015. "Two simple variations of top trading cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 123-140, September.

  13. Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
    2. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
    3. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
    4. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "Incompatibility between stability and consistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 135-137.

  14. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 176-179.

    Cited by:

    1. Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2018. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Nickesha Ayoade & Szilvia Pápai, 2020. "School Choice with Preference Rank Classes," Working Papers 20002, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    3. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
    4. Burak Can & Mohsen Pourpouneh & Ton Storcken, 2020. "Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings," IFRO Working Paper 2020/10, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    5. Yajing Chen & Patrick Harless & Zhenhua Jiao, 2021. "The probabilistic rank random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization," Papers 2104.09165, arXiv.org.
    6. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    7. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia‐Ling Hsu, 2023. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1064-1077, October.
    8. Battal Dogan & Bettina Klaus, 2018. "Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.15, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    9. Yajing Chen, 2017. "New axioms for deferred acceptance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 393-408, February.
    10. Dur, Umut Mert, 2019. "The modified Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 31-40.
    11. Dur, Umut, 2012. "A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem," MPRA Paper 41366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Kasajima, Yoichi & Toda, Manabu, 2024. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 269-286.
    13. Harless, Patrick, 2014. "A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance," MPRA Paper 61417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Yoichi Kasajima & Manabu Toda, 2021. "Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems," Working Papers 2023-1, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    15. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
    16. Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2024. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 308, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    17. Yajing Chen, 2016. "New axioms for immediate acceptance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 329-337, December.

  15. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.

    Cited by:

    1. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
    2. Azar Abizada, 2017. "Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 879-890, August.
    3. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.
    4. Abizada, Azar, 2016. "Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    5. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2016. "Enrollment manipulations in school choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 119-125.
    6. Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
    7. Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
    8. Fisher, James C.D., 2020. "Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 136-140.

  16. Mustafa Oguz Afacan, 2012. "On The "Group Non-bossiness" Property," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1571-1575.

    Cited by:

    1. William Thomson, 2014. "Non-bossiness," RCER Working Papers 586, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    2. Eduardo Duque & Juan S. Pereyra & Juan Pablo Torres-Mart'inez, 2024. "Local non-bossiness and preferences over colleagues," Papers 2406.01398, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.

  17. Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa, 2012. "Group robust stability in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 394-398.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2018-03-19 2023-01-09
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2018-03-19
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2018-03-19
  4. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (1) 2023-01-09

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