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A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Aram Grigoryan

    (University of California)

  • Markus Möller

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes of allocation mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2024. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 308, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:308
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_308_2024.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2024
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yinghua He & Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia & Jianye Yan, 2018. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 272-314, August.
    2. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 176-179.
    3. Yan Chen & Onur Kesten, 2017. "Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 99-139.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auditability; Allocation Mechanisms;

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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