A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Yinghua He & Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia & Jianye Yan, 2018.
"A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 272-314, August.
- He, Yinghua & Miralles, Antonio & Pycia, Marek & Yan, Jianye, 2015. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities," TSE Working Papers 15-601, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2017.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 176-179.
- Yan Chen & Onur Kesten, 2017. "Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 99-139.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Afacan, Mustafa Og̃uz & Dur, Umut Mert, 2017. "When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 16-24.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022.
"School Choice,"
NBER Working Papers
29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023.
"School choice with preference rank classes,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
- Nickesha Ayoade & Szilvia Pápai, 2020. "School Choice with Preference Rank Classes," Working Papers 20002, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2025. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_652, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2019.
"Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 147-163.
- Joana Pais & Marc Vorsatz & Flip Klijn, 2016. "Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 926, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Joana Pais & Flip Klijn & Marc Vorsatz, 2017. "Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers REM 2017/04, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
- Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021.
"How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 198-237.
- Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 114, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2019. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Christian Basteck & Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2018. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Basteck, Christian & Klaus, Bettina & Kübler, Dorothea, 2018. "How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Author-Name: Christian Basteck & Author-Name: Bettina Klaus & Dorothea Kuebler, 2021. "How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Can, Burak & Pourpouneh, Mohsen & Storcken, Ton, 2017.
"Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings,"
Research Memorandum
015, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Burak Can & Mohsen Pourpouneh & Ton Storcken, 2020. "Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings," IFRO Working Paper 2020/10, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
- Bo, Shiyu & Liu, Jing & Shiu, Ji-Liang & Song, Yan & Zhou, Sen, 2019. "Admission mechanisms and the mismatch between colleges and students: Evidence from a large administrative dataset from China," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 27-37.
- Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020.
"Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions,"
Papers
2001.06166, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
- Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander Nesterov, 2020. "Comparing School Choice And College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity To Strategic Admissions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 222/EC/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Josu'e Ortega, 2018. "The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large," Papers 1810.10287, arXiv.org.
- Bó, Inácio & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2022.
"The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 411-433.
- Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Hakimov, Rustamdjan, 2016. "The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-212, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Yan Chen & Yingzhi Liang & Tayfun Sönmez, 2016. "School choice under complete information: An experimental study," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 45-82, December.
- Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022.
"Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?,"
Papers
2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
- Cantillon, Estelle & Chen, Li & Pereyra, Juan, 2024. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," CEPR Discussion Papers 18744, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alexander Nesterov & Olga Rospuskova & Sofia Rubtcova, 2024. "Robustness to manipulations in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(3), pages 519-548, May.
- Julien Combe & Vladyslav Nora & Olivier Tercieux, 2021. "Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms," Working Papers 2021-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Atı̇la Abdulkadı̇roğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2022.
"Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 117-151, January.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2170R Publication Status:, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2020.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Angrist, Joshua & Narita, Yusuke & Pathak, Parag A., 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," IZA Discussion Papers 12205, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2020. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Papers 2101.01093, arXiv.org.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Working Papers 2019-024, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2019. "Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2170, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Tommy Andersson & Umut Dur & Sinan Ertemel & Onur Kesten, 2024.
"Sequential school choice with public and private schools,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 231-276, September.
- Andersson, Tommy & Dur, Umut & Ertemel, Sinan & Kesten, Onur, 2018. "Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools," Working Papers 2018:39, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 31 Oct 2023.
- Mari TANAKA & Yusuke NARITA & Chiaki MORIGUCHI, 2020.
"Meritocracy and Its Discontent: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms,"
Discussion papers
20002, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Chiaki Moriguchi & Yusuke Narita & Mari Tanaka, 2024. "Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms," Papers 2402.04429, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
- Yusuke Narita & Chiaki Moriguchi & Mari Tanaka, 2024. "Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Long-run Effects of Repeated School Admission Reforms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2390, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2016. "Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.23, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Akyol, Ethem, 2023. "Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Auditability; Allocation Mechanisms;JEL classification:
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-07-08 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2024-07-08 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ECONtribute Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.econtribute.de .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.