Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12515
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Dogan, Battal & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
- Battal Doğan & Lars Ehlers, 2022.
"Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 556-582, November.
- Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 2020-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Battal Dogan & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 02-2020, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"Pairwise kidney exchange,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2005.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Sönmez, Tayfun & Utku Ünver, M. & Roth, Alvin E., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Scholarly Articles 32072400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"The New York City High School Match,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
- Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562765, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2017.
"On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 27-43.
- HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2015. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2015-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- HIRATA, Daisuke & 平田, 大祐 & KASUYA, Yusuke & 糟谷, 祐介, 2016. "On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016-13, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Inácio Bó & Bertan Turhan, 2023.
"Assignment maximization,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 123-138, February.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Turhan, Bertan, 2018. "Assignment maximization," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Mustafa Ou{g}uz Afacan & In'acio B'o & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," Papers 2012.01011, arXiv.org.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oguz & Bó, Inácio & Turhan, Bertan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," ISU General Staff Papers 202001090800001092, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020.
"Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching,"
American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 425-442, December.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03029897, HAL.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," Post-Print halshs-03029897, HAL.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013.
"School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," NBER Working Papers 16783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 784, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Pycia, Marek & Unver, Utku, 2017.
"Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 715, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2014.
- Erdil, Aytek, 2014. "Strategy-proof stochastic assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 146-162.
- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2016.
"Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 128-146.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2014. "Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Lars EHLERS & Bettina KLAUS, 2014. "Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance : Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics," Cahiers de recherche 14-2014, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2014. "Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics," Cahiers de recherche 2014-10, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2015. "Size versus fairness in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-127.
- Itai Ashlagi & Amin Saberi & Ali Shameli, 2020. "Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 467-479, March.
- Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf, 2019. "Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 167-187.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
- Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984.
"The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
- Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Scholarly Articles 29410143, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009.
"Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," Scholarly Articles 11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2020. "Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 937-965, July.
- Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2019. "Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 121-142.
- Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
- Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
- Yan Chen & Onur Kesten, 2017. "Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 99-139.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Zhang, Jun, 2023. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-67.
- Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024.
"School choice with transferable student characteristics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez & Antonio Romero Medina, 2020. "School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2020-04, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
- Morrill, Thayer, 2015. "Making just school assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 18-27.
- Dur, Umut & Paiement, Scott, 2024.
"A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 93-100.
- Dur, Umut, 2012. "A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem," MPRA Paper 41366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022.
"School Choice,"
Working Papers
2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Inácio Bó & Bertan Turhan, 2023.
"Assignment maximization,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 123-138, February.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari & Turhan, Bertan, 2018. "Assignment maximization," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Mustafa Ou{g}uz Afacan & In'acio B'o & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," Papers 2012.01011, arXiv.org.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oguz & Bó, Inácio & Turhan, Bertan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," ISU General Staff Papers 202001090800001092, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2016. "On the operation of multiple matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 166-185.
- Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min, 2018.
"Matching in the large: An experimental study,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 295-317.
- Yan Chen & Ming Jiang & Onur Kesten & Stéphane Robin & Min Zhu, 2017. "Matching in the Large: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 1702, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Yan Chen & Min Jiang & Onur Kesten & Stéphane Robin & Min Zhu, 2018. "Matching in the large: An experimental study," Post-Print hal-01823548, HAL.
- Yan Chen & Ming Jiang & Onur Kesten & Stéphane Robin & Min Zhu, 2017. "Matching in the Large: An Experimental Study," Working Papers halshs-01432941, HAL.
- Morrill, Thayer & Roth, Alvin E., 2024. "Top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
- Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
- Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023.
"School choice with preference rank classes,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
- Nickesha Ayoade & Szilvia Pápai, 2020. "School Choice with Preference Rank Classes," Working Papers 20002, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Han, Xiang, 2024. "On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
- Alvin Roth, 2008.
"Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
- Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," NBER Working Papers 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
- Marek Bojko, 2020. "The Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms with Minimum Quotas," Papers 2012.11028, arXiv.org.
- Mennle, Timo & Seuken, Sven, 2021. "Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia‐Ling Hsu, 2023. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1064-1077, October.
- Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023.
"The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
- Josue Ortega & Thilo Klein, 2022. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Papers 2204.07255, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:125:y:2023:i:2:p:321-338. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.