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School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan

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  • Yasunori Okumura

Abstract

This study considers a school choice problem with general feasibility constraints. Each student belongs to a grade; and 2 students belonging to the same grade are symmetric, whereas those belonging to different grades can be asymmetric with respect to the feasibility constraint of a school. We introduce five requirements of a matching and a polynomial‐time algorithm to derive a matching satisfying them. Because the algorithm is inspired by the nursery school system of Yokohama City, we introduce the system and compare it with the algorithm of this study.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 497-516, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:70:y:2019:i:4:p:497-516
    DOI: 10.1111/jere.12212
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    Cited by:

    1. Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 2024. "Efficient matching under general constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 197-207.
    2. Yamaguchi, Tomoaki & Yahiro, Kentaro & Yokoo, Makoto, 2019. "Student-Project-Resource Matching-Allocation Problems: Game Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 92720, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Yasushi Kawase & Hanna Sumita & Yu Yokoi, 2022. "Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints," Papers 2208.07666, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    4. Kitahara, Minoru & Okumura, Yasunori, 2019. "On the number of employed in the matching model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 63-69.
    5. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2021. "Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 971-987, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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