When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.03.001
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Cited by:
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- Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur & Kiefer, Alexander & Melatos, Mark, 2020. "Evaluating Advice in a Matching Mechanism with Experienced Participants: An Experimental Study of University Applicant Behaviour in Australia," Working Papers 2020-13, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Guillen, Pablo & Kesten, Onur & Kiefer, Alexander & Melatos, Mark, 2020. "A Field Evaluation of a Matching Mechanism: University Applicant Behaviour in Australia," Working Papers 2020-15, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Harless, Patrick, 2014. "A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance," MPRA Paper 61417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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