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Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

Author

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  • Scott Duke Kominers

    (Harvard University and a16z crypto, USA)

Abstract

One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as matching with slot-specific preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Duke Kominers, 2024. "Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 9(1), pages 83-104, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a5
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.005
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; market entry; respect for improvements.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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