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The contingent value of pay inequalities in sales organizations: integrating literatures in economics, management, and psychology

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  • Maria Rouziou

    (Wilfrid Laurier University)

Abstract

Pay-for-performance compensation systems are often employed in sales organizations and can potentially lead to pay inequalities. With increased transparency of employees’ pay outcomes stemming from CRM and related technologies, salespeople now have ample opportunity to observe these inequalities, compare their pay with that of others, and make fairness assessments. These comparisons and assessments then have implications in terms of utility, behaviors, and performance of salespeople, which have scarcely been explored in the sales or marketing literature. This article considers research on pay inequality from three other fields – economics, management, and psychology – and highlights relevant issues in sales contexts. Furthermore, the article provides scholars with a resource that elaborates on the nature of pay inequalities and their multiple outcomes on individual and organizational performance, as well as noting their likely antecedents and moderators.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Rouziou, 2019. "The contingent value of pay inequalities in sales organizations: integrating literatures in economics, management, and psychology," AMS Review, Springer;Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 9(3), pages 184-204, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:amsrev:v:9:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s13162-019-00147-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s13162-019-00147-7
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