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The healthy fright of losing a good one for a bad one

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  • Cristini, Annalisa
  • Origo, Federica
  • Pinoli, Sara

Abstract

•We study changes in employment protection (EPL) on absenteeism.•We focus on permanent vs two types of temporary contract transitions.•We use individual-level panel data and find asymmetric responses to changes in EPL.•Significant overreaction of permanent workers is observed when they lose protection.•Findings are in line with psychological explanations of asymmetric reactions to good vs bad news.

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  • Cristini, Annalisa & Origo, Federica & Pinoli, Sara, 2017. "The healthy fright of losing a good one for a bad one," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 129-144.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:59:y:2017:i:c:p:129-144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.013
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincenzo Scoppa & Daniela Vuri, 2014. "Absenteeism, unemployment and employment protection legislation: evidence from Italy," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, December.
    2. René Böheim & Thomas Leoni, 2014. "Firms' Sickness Costs and Workers' Sickness Absences," NBER Working Papers 20305, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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