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Effort reduction of employer‐to‐employer changers: Empirical evidence from football

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  • Daniel Weimar
  • Katrin Scharfenkamp

Abstract

We investigate changes in effort investment of employees who still fulfill a contract with their current employer but already signed a follow‐up contract with a new employer (employer‐to‐employer change). Because effort and outside contract assignments are hard to measure in firms, we use running data from professional football (n = 26,577) to proxy effort decisions. Fixed effect regressions reveal a statistically significant but weak reduction in a player's effort after signing a follow‐up contract with a new club. Because we find a statistically significant effort reduction in public sports, this effect might be even larger in less transparent labor markets.

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  • Daniel Weimar & Katrin Scharfenkamp, 2019. "Effort reduction of employer‐to‐employer changers: Empirical evidence from football," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(3), pages 277-291, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:3:p:277-291
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3001
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