Imperfect cartelization in OPEC
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DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.10.010
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- Okullo, Samuel & Reynes, F., 2016. "Imperfect Cartelization in OPEC," Discussion Paper 2016-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
Imperfect cartels; Oil; OPEC; Nash bargaining; Collusion strategies;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
- Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
Statistics
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