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Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions--a sequential closed-loop game approach

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  • Yang, Zili

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  • Yang, Zili, 2003. "Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions--a sequential closed-loop game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1563-1594, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:27:y:2003:i:9:p:1563-1594
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    1. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    3. Hoel, Michael, 1993. "Intertemporal properties of an international carbon tax," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 51-70, March.
    4. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-765, September.
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    1. M. Breton & G. Martín-Herrán & G. Zaccour, 2006. "Equilibrium Investment Strategies in Foreign Environmental Projects," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 23-40, July.
    2. Shiell, Leslie & Lyssenko, Nikita, 2008. "Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1543-1568, May.
    3. Diekert, Florian K. & Hjermann, Dag Ø. & Nævdal, Eric & Stenseth, Nils Chr., 2010. "Non-cooperative exploitation of multi-cohort fisheries--The role of gear selectivity in the North-East Arctic cod fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 78-92, January.
    4. Genc, Talat S. & De Giovanni, Pietro, 2018. "Optimal return and rebate mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 269(2), pages 661-681.
    5. Richard S.J. Tol, 2013. "Long live the Kyoto Protocol!," Chapters, in: Roger Fouquet (ed.), Handbook on Energy and Climate Change, chapter 14, pages 344-351, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Genc, Talat S., 2017. "The impact of lead time on capital investments," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 142-164.
    7. Tol, Richard S.J., 2013. "Targets for global climate policy: An overview," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 911-928.
    8. Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Tarui, Nori, 2017. "Cooperation on climate-change mitigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 43-55.
    9. Okullo, Samuel J. & Reynès, Frédéric, 2016. "Imperfect cartelization in OPEC," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 333-344.
    10. Ngo Van Long, 2019. "Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters," CESifo Working Paper Series 7880, CESifo.
    11. Li, Liming & Chen, Weidong, 2021. "The impact of subsidies in a transboundary pollution game with myopic players," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    12. Marian Leimbach & Anselm Schultes & Lavinia Baumstark & Anastasis Giannousakis & Gunnar Luderer, 2017. "Solution algorithms for regional interactions in large-scale integrated assessment models of climate change," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 255(1), pages 29-45, August.

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