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Open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vs.-fringe model

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  • Groot, F.
  • Withagen, C.A.A.M.
  • de Zeeuw, A.J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Groot, F. & Withagen, C.A.A.M. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 2000. "Open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vs.-fringe model," Other publications TiSEM dfbd8251-6ed5-4895-9cc5-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:dfbd8251-6ed5-4895-9cc5-6d8908a20db2
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    1. Richard J. Gilbert, 1978. "Dominant Firm Pricing Policy in a Market for an Exhaustible Resource," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 385-395, Autumn.
    2. A. M. Ulph & G. M. Folie, 1980. "Exhaustible Resources and Cartels: An Intertemporal Nash-Cournot Model," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(4), pages 645-658, November.
    3. Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart, 1992. "Note on the Open-Loop von Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Cartel versus Fringe Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(415), pages 1478-1484, November.
    4. Harold Hotelling, 1931. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 137-137.
    5. Salant, Stephen W, 1976. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 1079-1093, October.
    6. Tracy R. Lewis & Richard Schmalensee, 1980. "On Oligopolistic Markets for Nonrenewable Natural Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 95(3), pages 475-491.
    7. Pindyck, Robert S, 1978. "Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of Exhaustible Resources," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 238-251, May.
    8. Newbery, David M G, 1981. "Oil Prices, Cartels, and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 617-646, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Kagan & Frederick Ploeg & Cees Withagen, 2015. "Battle for Climate and Scarcity Rents: Beyond the Linear-Quadratic Case," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 493-522, December.
    2. Wan, Rui & Boyce, John R., 2014. "Non-renewable resource Stackelberg games," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 102-121.
    3. Zili Yang, 2013. "Is the Leading Role Desirable?: A Simulation Analysis of the Stackelberg Behavior in World Petroleum Market," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(1), pages 133-150, June.
    4. Behnaz Minooei Fard & Willi Semmler & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2023. "Rare Earth Elements: A game between China and the rest of the world," Working Papers in Public Economics 235, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    5. Berthod, Mathias & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2019. "On agreements in a nonrenewable resource market: A cooperative differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 23-39.
    6. Okullo, Samuel J. & Reynès, Frédéric, 2016. "Imperfect cartelization in OPEC," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 333-344.

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