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Content
April 2002, Volume 81, Issue 2
- 223-246 Economic impacts of transportation network changes: Implementation of a combined transportation network and input-output model
by Tschangho John Kim & Heejoo Ham & David E. Boyce - 247-278 Explaining regional economic performance: An historical application of a dynamic multi-regional CGE model
by James Giesecke - 279-290 Two frontiers for regional science: Regional policy and interdisciplinary reach
by Ann Markusen - 291-299 Book reviews
by Vera Pavlakovich-Kochi & Adrian X. Esparza & Geoffrey Bertram & William B. Beyers
2002, Volume 7, Issue 2
- 117-134 original papers : Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem
by Jinpeng Ma - 135-153 original papers : Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality
by Florence Naegelen - 155-171 original papers : Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities
by Gopal Das Varma - 173-185 original papers : Safety regulation and monitor liability
by Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess - 187-204 original papers : Constitutional implementation
by Eyal Winter & Bezalel Peleg - 205-211 original papers : Proportionally adjusted marginal pricing method to share joint costs
by YunTong Wang - 213-228 original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
by Pierre Favardin & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais
2002, Volume 7, Issue 1
- 1-15 A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology
by François Maniquet - 17-26 The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation
by Sandeep Baliga - 27-43 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory
by Walter Trockel - 45-56 How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation
by Hans Gersbach - 57-73 Can we identify Walrasian allocations?
by Antonio Manresa - 75-91 Achieving the first best in sequencing problems
by Manipushpak Mitra - 93-104 Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games Marta Faias (1), Emma Moreno-García (1)(2), Mário Rui Páscoa (2) (1) Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estevao Pinto, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal (e-mail: mcm@mail.fct.unl.pt; pascoa@fe.unl.pt) (2) Departamento de Economía e Historia Económica, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, Edificio F.E.S., Campus Miguel de Unamuno, 37008 Salamanca, Spain (e-mail: emmam@usal.es) Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001 JEL classification: D41, D51 Key words: Perfect competition, monopolistic power, Walrasian equilibrium, thick markets
by Mário Rui Páscoa & Emma Moreno-García & Marta Faias - 105-115 Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued
by Lars Ehlers
2001, Volume 6, Issue 3
- 325-342 Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
by Steven R. Williams - 343-352 Majority rule with dollar voting
by James S. Jordan - 353-370 Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution
by Charles A. Wilson - 371-396 Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment
by Andrés Velasco & Jess Benhabib & Aldo Rustichini - 397-412 Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?
by Akihiko Matsui & Roger Lagunoff - 413-428 Trust and social efficiencies
by Robert W. Rosenthal - 429-446 Survival and the art of profit maximization
by Prajit K. Dutta & Rangarajan K. Sundaram - 447-460 Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity
by Sang-Chul Suh - 461-480 First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
by Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir
2001, Volume 6, Issue 2
- 133-153 original papers : On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy
by Rabi N. Bhattacharya & Mukul Majumdar - 155-173 original papers : Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable
by Rose-Anne Dana - 185-214 original papers : A model of Russia's "virtual economy"
by Richard E. Ericson & Barry W. Ickes - 215-223 original papers : Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments
by Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 225-239 original papers : Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives
by Peter B. Linhart - 241-261 original papers : Investment and concern for relative position
by George J. Mailath & Harold L. Cole & Andrew Postlewaite - 289-304 original papers : Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching
by Leonid Hurwicz & Stanley Reiter
2001, Volume 6, Issue 1
- 5-40 original papers : Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design
by Semih Koray & Rudolf Kerschbamer - 41-61 original papers : Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
by Pablo AmorÕs & Bernardo Moreno - 63-84 original papers : Implementation with partial verification
by Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman - 85-98 original papers : Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited
by Bettina Klaus - 99-111 original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
by Ahmet Alkan - 113-124 original papers : Returns to scale in one-shot information processing when hours count
by Catherine de Fontenay & Kieron J. Meagher
2000, Volume 5, Issue 4
- 365-385 original papers : Altruism, redistribution and social insurance
by Udo Ebert & Oskar von dem Hagen - 387-410 original papers : Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?
by Ken Binmore & Joe Swierzbinski - 411-432 original papers : Abstention and political competition
by Humberto G. Llavador
2000, Volume 5, Issue 3
- 205-228 original papers : A strategic analysis of network reliability
by Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal - 229-249 original papers : Network formation with sequential demands
by Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli - 251-272 original papers : The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks
by Matthew O. Jackson & Bhaskar Dutta - 273-299 original papers : Spatial social networks
by Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson - 301-331 original papers : Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks
by Deborah F. Minehart & Rachel E. Kranton - 333-362 original papers : Network formation models with costs for establishing links
by (*), Anne van den Nouweland & Marco Slikker
2000, Volume 5, Issue 2
- 111-127 original papers : Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms
by Bhaskar Dutta & Salvador BarberÁ - 129-147 original papers : Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods
by Francis Bloch & Sayantan Ghosal - 149-175 original papers : Coalition formation in general NTU games
by Anke Gerber - 177-199 original papers : Project evaluation and organizational form
by Thomas Gehrig & Pierre Regibeau & Kate Rockett
2000, Volume 5, Issue 1
- 1-21 original papers : Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment
by Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet - 23-58 original papers : On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results
by Peter S. Faynzilberg & Praveen Kumar - 59-70 original papers: On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers
by Domenico Menicucci - 71-89 original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation
by Paulo K. Monteiro & Flavio M. Menezes - 91-105 original papers : Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas
by Szilvia PÂpai
1999, Volume 4, Issue 4
- 295-305 Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology
by Andrzej Baniak & Jacek Cukrowski - 307-343 A profit-center game with incomplete information
by Roy Radner & Tatsuro Ichiishi - 345-356 Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives
by M.J. Albizuri & J.C. Santos & J.M. Zarzuelo - 357-379 Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods
by Josef Falkinger & Johann K. Brunner - 381-387 Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness
by Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg - 389-393 Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible
by John A. Weymark
1999, Volume 4, Issue 3
- 191-204 Optimal regulation of technical progress in natural monopolies with asymmetric information
by Thomas Kuhn & Uwe Cantner - 205-218 A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms
by Liqun Liu & Guoqiang Tian - 219-230 A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets
by Ezra Einy & David Wettstein - 231-254 Multiproject team assignments
by Katerina Sherstyuk - 255-272 Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem
by M. Angeles de Frutos - 273-292 Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment
by Michael Peters
1999, Volume 4, Issue 2
- 101-126 Hierarchies and information-processing organizations
by Hao Li - 127-151 Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies
by Naoki Yoshihara - 153-160 A social choice function implementable via backward induction with values in the ultimate uncovered set
by Michel Le Breton & Peter J. Coughlan - 161-177 Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer
by Hiroshi Osano - 179-187 A note on van Damme's mechanism
by Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg
1999, Volume 4, Issue 1
- 1-12 Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination
by JosÊ RamÕn Uriarte - 13-33 Monotonic extensions on economic domains
by William Thomson - 35-55 Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis
by Dirk Van de gaer & Marc Fleurbaey & Walter Bossert - 57-72 Feasible implementation of taxation methods
by Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano - 73-97 The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction
by David P. Porter
1998, Volume 3, Issue 4
- 303-328 On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts
by Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky - 329-345 Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing
by Kieron Meagher & Timothy Van Zandt - 347-357 Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism: a closed form solution
by Rajat Deb & Tae Kun Seo - 359-369 Process innovation and the persistence of monopoly with labour-managed firms
by Luca Lambertini - 371-387 Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity
by Leslie M. Marx
1998, Volume 3, Issue 3
- 195-213 Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods
by Carmen Bevi - 215-236 On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture
by Klaus Ritzberger & Werner Güth - 237-255 A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information
by C. Choe - 257-269 Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior
by Indrajit Ray - 271-300 Implementing action profiles with sequential mechanisms
by Sandro Brusco
1998, Volume 3, Issue 2
- 93-127 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks
by Timothy Van Zandt - 129-135 Equitable nature of core allocations in atomless economies
by Farhad HØsseinov - 137-147 Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
by Antonio Romero-Medina - 149-157 Organizational design with a budget constraint
by Hans Gersbach & Uwe Wehrspohn - 159-165 Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies
by Shinsuke Nakamura - 167-191 An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments
by John Duggan
1997, Volume 3, Issue 1
- 1-13 Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
by Frank H. Page Jr. - 15-27 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks
by Timothy Van Zandt - 29-43 Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods
by (*), Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Buchholz & Kjell Erik Lommerud - 45-55 Redistribution and individual characteristics
by IÓigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe - 57-74 Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments
by Hiroaki Osana - 75-89 Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian
by John Wooders
December 1996, Volume 2, Issue 1
- 1-31 On economies of scope in communication
by Thomas Marschak - 33-68 Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action
by Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak - 69-88 Capabilities and utilities
by Carmen Herrero - 89-97 A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium
by Bezalel Peleg - 99-115 Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file
by Inés Macho-Stadler & J. Pérez-Castrillo - 119-146 Envy-minimizing unemployment benefits
by Christian Arnsperger & David Croix - 147-162 Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms
by Gregory Dow - 163-192 The allocation of a shared resource within an organization
by John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter - 193-209 On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making
by Jeroen Suijs - 211-243 On endogenous economic regulation
by Stanley Reiter - 245-261 Public good provision and the Smith Process
by Steffen Ziss - 263-281 Instability in the labor market for researchers
by J. Pérez-Castrillo - 283-309 Common value auctions with independent types
by Fernando Branco - 311-324 Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism
by Bezalel Peleg - 325-337 Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism
by Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie - 339-368 Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option
by Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini - 369-378 Investment timing and efficiency in incomplete contracts
by James Dearden & Dorothy Klotz - 379-397 Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly
by Jonathan Hamilton & Jacques-François Thisse - 399-421 Two versions of the tragedy of the commons
by Hervé Moulin & Alison Watts
December 1994, Volume 1, Issue 1
- 1-14 Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions
by Leonid Hurwicz - 15-39 On the relationship between economic development and political democracy
by John Roemer - 41-54 2-person Bayesian implementation
by Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen - 55-77 Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching
by Ebbe Hendon & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranæs - 79-102 On the possibility of efficient bilateral trade
by Sanjeev Goyal - 103-117 Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms
by Lu Hong & Scott Page - 119-140 Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism
by Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshikatsu Tatamitani - 141-158 A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods
by Jose Aizpurua & Antonio Manresa - 159-171 Robust implementation under alternative information structures
by Luis Corchon & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin - 173-203 Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments
by Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra - 205-216 Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems
by John Conley & Simon Wilkie - 217-224 A principal-agent model of altruistic redistribution, with some implications for fiscal federalism
by Mark Shroder - 227-250 A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal
by Shasikanta Nandeibam - 251-274 On the screening power of incentive schemes
by Fredrik Andersson - 275-287 Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets
by José Alcalde - 289-299 Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences
by Dominique Lepelley - 301-317 A mechanism implementing the proportional solution
by Sang-Chul Suh - 319-326 Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly
by Mark Gradstein - 327-341 Implementation and information in teams
by Tomas Sjöström - 343-354 Implementation by demand mechanisms
by Tomas Sjöström - 355-363 Strategic participation and the median voter result
by David Sunding - 365-380 Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems
by Tayfun Sönmez