original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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Note: Received: 5 March 1999 / Accepted: 12 May 2000
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Cited by:
- Monjardet, Bernard, 2003. "The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 103-144, October.
- Yuichiro Kamada & Fuhito Kojima, 2020. "Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 101-133, January.
- Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
- Rêgo, Leandro Chaves & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2022. "Choice stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 301(3), pages 1064-1071.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2007.
"Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 537-547, May.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems," Cahiers de recherche 12-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems," Cahiers de recherche 2005-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2014.
"On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 793-811, April.
- Paula Jaramillo & Kagi Cagatay & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets," Documentos de Trabajo 9997, Universidad del Rosario.
- Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 632, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kay & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Documentos CEDE 10316, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Cantala, David, 2004. "Restabilizing matching markets at senior level," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-17, July.
- Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018.
"Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-20.
- Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Tsuyoshi Adachi & Yuki Ishibashi, 2022. "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with interval constraints," Working Papers 2124, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
- David Cantala, 2011. "Agreement toward stability in matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 293-316, December.
- Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2010. "The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 937-949, September.
- Klijn, Flip & Yazıcı, Ayşe, 2014.
"A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 63-73.
- Flip Klijn, 2011. "A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 877.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Flip Klijn & Ay?e Yaz?c?, 2014. "A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"," Working Papers 567, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2004. "An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 187-210, March.
- , & ,, 2006.
"A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Game Theory and Information 0401002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine.
- Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2018. "Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang & Chen, Songqing & Yang, Fei, 2016. "The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 65-71.
- Chambers, Christopher P. & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "On lexicographic choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 222-224.
- Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro, 2012. "Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 428-434.
- Yang, Yi-You, 2020. "Rationalizable choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 120-126.
- Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro, 2011. "Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 135-137, August.
- Mehmet Ekmekci & M. Bumin Yenmez, "undated". "Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
- David Cantala, 2002. "Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200201, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Jun 2007.
- Battal Doğan & Kemal Yildiz, 2023. "Choice with Affirmative Action," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2284-2296, April.
- Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang, 2017. "The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-55.
More about this item
Keywords
Stable matchings; revealed preference; choice function; lattice;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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