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original papers : Abstention and political competition

Author

Listed:
  • Humberto G. Llavador

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616-8578, USA)

Abstract

The classical literature on spatial majority voting postulates that all citizens vote. The Median Voter Theorem (MVT) then obtains when parties have perfect information on voter behavior and are either office-seekers ("Downsian") or ideological. This paper introduces abstention, a simple yet realistic modification. We show that the main features of the MVT survive to a large extent but subject to some qualifications. First, the winning policy does not bear any necessary relation to the median voter. Second, there exist examples in which the candidates choose different positions at equilibrium. Third, equilibrium may fail to exist or be unique. Finally, the equilibria of the model with office-motivated parties may differ from the ones where parties are ideological.

Suggested Citation

  • Humberto G. Llavador, 2000. "original papers : Abstention and political competition," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(4), pages 411-432.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:4:p:411-432
    Note: Received: 18 September 1999 / Accepted: 31 January 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abellanas, Manuel & Lillo, Isabel & Lopez, M Dolores & Rodrigo, Javier, 2006. "Electoral strategies in a dynamical democratic system. Geometric models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(2), pages 870-878, December.
    2. Alessandro Morselli, 2021. "Individual decisions and collective choices in the history of economic thought," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 77-96,97-11.
    3. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Abstention; alienation; political competition; median voter theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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