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A note on van Damme's mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, P.O. Box 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany)

Abstract

We consider (two-person) bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. A mechanism is a function which assigns an allocation to every bargaining game and every pair of bargaining solutions. Examining van Damme's mechanism (1986) from a cooperative point of view we see that it fails to satisfy Pareto-optimality. By modifying it we propose a new mechanism yielding the same conclusions as the original while enjoying some additional desirable properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg, 1999. "A note on van Damme's mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 179-187.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:179-187
    Note: Received: 8 August 1998 / Accepted: 15 October 1998
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. José M. Jiménez Gómez & María del Carmen Marco Gil & Pedro Gadea Blanco, 2010. "Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Trockel, Walter, 2017. "Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 322, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2008. "Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 190(3), pages 659-671, November.
    4. Pedro Gadea-Blanco & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & M. Carmen Marco-Gil, 2016. "Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 449-465, September.
    5. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.
    6. Naeve-Steinweg, E., 2004. "The averaging mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 410-424, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Meta-bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; non-cooperative approach; cooperative approach; mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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