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A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets

Author

Listed:
  • Ezra Einy

    (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O. Box 653, Beer Sheva, Israel 84105)

  • David Wettstein

    (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O. Box 653, Beer Sheva, Israel 84105)

Abstract

This paper provides a non-cooperative interpretation for bargaining sets concepts in economic environments. We investigate the implementability of the Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets, and provide mechanisms whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes realize these sets. These mechanisms, in contrast to general mechanisms suggested in the implementation literature, have a natural structure closely related to that of the rationale underlying the bargaining sets. Furthermore, the strategy sets consist mainly of allocations and coalitions (thus avoiding any reference to preference parameters) and are finite dimensional.

Suggested Citation

  • Ezra Einy & David Wettstein, 1999. "A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 219-230.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:219-230
    Note: Received: 17 February 1997 / Accepted: 2 February 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Borm, Peter & Ju, Yuan & Wettstein, David, 2015. "Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 236-254.
    2. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 292-308, May.
    3. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 26(2), pages 285-298, May.
    4. Hu, Cheng-Cheng, 2007. "A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 203-217, December.
    5. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    6. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
    7. Hu, Cheng-Cheng, 2010. "A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 884-892, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; bargaining sets;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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