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Envy-minimizing unemployment benefits

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  • Christian Arnsperger
  • David Croix

Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of the optimality of unemployment benefits based on the concept of no-envy. Using a general equilibrium framework whit uncertainty, we derive the conditions for a trade-off between the intensity of envy and the expected percentage of envious persons. If the government’s aversion for the intensity of envy is not too strong (alongside conditions on households’ utilities), the optimal benefit is positive and below the full insurance level. We also show that, for a low enough aversion for the intensity of envy, the optimal replacement ratio decreases with unfavorable changes in the distribution of the technological shock.
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Suggested Citation

  • Christian Arnsperger & David Croix, 1996. "Envy-minimizing unemployment benefits," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 119-146, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:119-146
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02499130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arnsperger, Christian, 1994. "Envy-Freeness and Distributive Justice," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 155-186, June.
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    4. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    5. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D63; H53; J65; Envy; Unemployment benefits; Fairness; Employment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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