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Content
November 2002, Volume 41, Issue 2
- 227-264 Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
by Hart, Sergiu
- 265-291 On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison
- 292-308 Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions
by Miyagawa, Eiichi
- 309-321 Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel
by Montero, Maria
- 322-343 A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme
by Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans
- 344-364 Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
by Warneryd, Karl
October 2002, Volume 41, Issue 1
- 1-25 The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study
by Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie
- 26-45 Fairness and learning: an experimental examination
by Cooper, David J. & Stockman, Carol Kraker
- 46-60 On (un)knots and dynamics in games
by Demichelis, Stefano & Germano, Fabrizio
- 61-78 Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality
by Mattsson, Lars-Goran & Weibull, Jorgen W.
- 79-102 Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 103-119 Calibration and Bayesian learning
by Turdaliev, Nurlan
- 120-140 On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes
by Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal
- 141-160 Eliciting information from multiple experts
by Wolinsky, Asher
- 161-164 A note on k-price auctions with complete information
by Tauman, Yair
- 165-168 Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games Econ. Behav. 38 (2002) 28-51]
by Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi
August 2002, Volume 40, Issue 2
- 153-184 An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
by Ania, Ana B. & Troger, Thomas & Wambach, Achim
- 185-202 Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
by Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc
- 203-231 Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach
by Charness, Gary & Haruvy, Ernan
- 232-269 Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition
by Droste, Edward & Hommes, Cars & Tuinstra, Jan
- 270-298 A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching
by Kosfeld, Michael & Droste, Edward & Voorneveld, Mark
- 299-321 Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
by Sekiguchi, Tadashi
- 322-338 A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
by Perea, Andres
July 2002, Volume 40, Issue 1
- 1-24 What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence
by Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise
- 25-43 The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining
by Chun, Youngsub
- 44-76 Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox
by Hehenkamp, Burkhard
- 77-98 Contractual Signaling in a Market Environment
by Inderst, Roman
- 99-122 The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi
- 123-146 An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games
by Morgan, John & Sefton, Martin
- 147-149 A Challenge to Formal Modeling of Poker and Bridge
by Dahl, Fredrik A.
- 150-152 In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi: Memory from China
by Tang, Fang-Fang
May 2002, Volume 39, Issue 2
- 177-205 Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence
by Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia
- 206-214 Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess
by Ewerhart, Christian
- 215-236 Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case
by Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O.
- 237-281 Chores
by LaCasse, Chantale & Ponsati, Clara & Barham, Vicky
- 282-291 Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information and with Observable Delay
by Normann, Hans-Theo
- 292-308 Bargaining and Bargaining Sets
by Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv
- 309-321 In Defense of DEFECT
by Volij, Oscar
April 2002, Volume 39, Issue 1
- 1-27 Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
by Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick
- 28-53 Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
by Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack
- 54-70 (Sophisticated) Stable Sets in Exchange Economies
by Greenberg, Joseph & Luo, Xiao & Oladi, Reza & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 71-90 Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection
by Juang, Wei-Torng
- 91-110 Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 111-136 Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players
by Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal
- 137-166 Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits, and Welfare
by Sgroi, Daniel
- 167-174 Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium
by Ryan, Matthew J.
February 2002, Volume 38, Issue 2
- 201-230 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
by Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O.
- 231-239 Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property
by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Pere Villar, Joan
- 240-264 To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets
by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
- 265-277 Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games
by Kar, Anirban
- 278-305 Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency
by Jude Kline, J.
- 306-317 Perfect Information and Potential Games
by Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
- 318-346 Stability and Segregation in Group Formation
by Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal
- 347-361 Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems
by Miyagawa, Eiichi
- 362-399 Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
by Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
January 2002, Volume 38, Issue 1
- 1-18 The Scholarship Assignment Problem
by Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo
- 19-27 Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions
by Bikhchandani, Sushil & Haile, Philip A. & Riley, John G.
- 28-51 Bargaining and Boldness
by Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi
- 52-88 Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment
by Dale, Donald J. & Morgan, John & Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 89-117 Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van den Elzen, Antoon
- 118-126 The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core
by Muller, Alfred & Scarsini, Marco & Shaked, Moshe
- 127-155 How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
by Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H.
- 156-175 Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games
by Van Huyck, John B. & Wildenthal, John M. & Battalio, Raymond C.
- 176-199 Starting Small and Commitment
by Watson, Joel
- 200-200 In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi (1920-2000)
by Shubik, Martin
November 2001, Volume 37, Issue 2
- 243-258 Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems
by Calvo, E. & Santos, J. C.
- 259-294 A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries
by Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar
- 295-320 Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers
by Gale, Douglas
- 321-339 Alternative Semantics for Unawareness
by Halpern, Joseph Y.
- 340-366 A Behavioral Learning Process in Games
by Laslier, Jean-Francois & Topol, Richard & Walliser, Bernard
- 367-387 Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
- 388-414 Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments
by Murnighan, J. Keith & Oesch, John M. & Pillutla, Madan
- 415-424 Game Theory via Revealed Preferences
by Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin
- 425-435 Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction
by Halpern, Joseph Y.
- 436-448 Coalition Formation and Potential Games
by Slikker, Marco
October 2001, Volume 37, Issue 1
- 1-25 Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
by Abbink, Klaus & Bolton, Gary E. & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Tang, Fang-Fang
- 26-39 Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games
by Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 40-78 Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
by Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J.
- 79-120 Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest
by Blume, Andreas & DeJong, Douglas V. & Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B.
- 121-160 On Money Pumps
by Cubitt, Robin P. & Sugden, Robert
- 161-169 The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
by Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland
- 170-195 Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration
by Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco
- 196-215 Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism
by Sobel, Joel
- 216-242 Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma
by Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan
August 2001, Volume 36, Issue 2
- 105-137 Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment
by Bosch-Domenech, Antoni & Saez-Marti, Maria
- 138-157 Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games
by Brandts, Jordi & Sola, Carles
- 158-173 Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules
by Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel
- 174-192 Average Monotonic Cooperative Games
by Izquierdo, Josep M. & Rafels, Carles
- 193-218 Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
by Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz
- 219-240 Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction
by Lopomo, Giuseppe
- 241-263 Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices
by Saari, Donald G. & Sieberg, Katri K.
- 264-275 Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment
by Offerman, Theo & Potters, Jan & Verbon, Harrie A. A.
July 2001, Volume 36, Issue 1
- 1-1 In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi 1920-2000
by Kalai, Ehud
- 2-4 Eulogy to My Father: John C. Harsanyi, 1920-2000
by Harsanyi, Tom
- 5-6 In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi
by Arrow, Kenneth J.
- 7-8 Harsanyi's Sweater
by Aumann, Robert J.
- 9-10 Creativity and Acclaim
by Binmore, Ken
- 11-11 Sociological Thinking
by Cseh-Szombathy, Laszlo
- 12-12 Homage from a Student
by Macgregor, Mary
- 13-14 My Encounters with John Harsanyi
by Maschler, Michael
- 15-18 Achievement Against Odds
by McGuire, C. Bart
- 19-19 Harsanyi's Intellectual Legacy
by Morini, Simona
- 20-25 Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi
by Myerson, Roger
- 26-27 A Friend and Colleague
by Polsby, Nelson N.
- 28-29 A Personal Tribute to John Harsanyi
by Samuelson, Paul A.
- 30-30 A Letter to the Editor
by Scitovsky, Tibor
- 31-46 John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator
by Selten, Reinhard
- 47-50 Postscript
by Selten, Reinhard
- 57-73 Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction
by Bonanno, Giacomo
- 74-103 Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects
by Gale, Ian L. & Stegeman, Mark
April 2001, Volume 35, Issue 1-2
- 1-5 Economics and Artificial Intelligence
by Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe & Varian, Hal
- 6-30 Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game
by Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry
- 31-53 Probability Logic for Type Spaces
by Heifetz, Aviad & Mongin, Philippe
- 54-79 Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization
by Lehmann, Daniel
- 80-123 Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations
by Greenwald, Amy & Friedman, Eric J. & Shenker, Scott
- 124-165 Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection
by Parkes, David C. & Huberman, Bernardo A.
- 166-196 Algorithmic Mechanism Design
by Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir
- 197-211 On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity
by Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 212-270 Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach
by Sandholm, Tuomas W. & Lesser, Victor R.
- 271-303 Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling
by Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
- 304-338 A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space
by Wurman, Peter R. & Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E.
- 339-348 Equilibria in Automated Interactions
by Vulkan, Nir
February 2001, Volume 34, Issue 2
- 177-199 Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium
by Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A.
- 200-226 Evolution and Mixed Strategies
by Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry
- 227-237 Stability and Largeness of the Core
by Biswas, Amit K. & Parthasarathy, T. & Ravindran, G.
- 238-269 Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis
by Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Zauner, Klaus G.
- 270-286 On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games
by De Sinopoli, Francesco
- 287-311 Private Value Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information
by Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 312-330 Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games
by Robles, Jack
- 331-341 A Dynamic Model of Network Formation
by Watts, Alison
- 342-363 On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games
by Wooders, John & Shachat, Jason M.
January 2001, Volume 34, Issue 1
- 1-10 Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty
by Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans
- 11-33 An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play
by Cox, James C. & Shachat, Jason & Walker, Mark
- 34-63 Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games
by Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Jensen, Mogens & Sloth, Birgitte
- 64-82 Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object
by Klaus, Bettina
- 83-103 Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers
by Ma, Jinpeng
- 104-122 Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice
by Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid
- 123-137 Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory
by Schwalbe, Ulrich & Walker, Paul
- 138-152 Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples
by Selten, Reinhard & Wooders, Myrna H.
- 153-175 A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division
by Slikker, Marco & van den Nouweland, Anne
November 2000, Volume 33, Issue 2
- 159-176 Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments
by Baliga, Sandeep & Evans, Robert
- 177-194 Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture
by Charness, Gary
- 195-205 Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)
by Che, Yeon-Koo
- 206-230 On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings
by Chung, Kim-Sau
- 231-248 Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities
by Haile, Philip A.
- 249-264 The Choquet Bargaining Solutions
by Ok, Efe A. & Zhou, Lin
- 265-273 A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction
by Perry, Motty & Wolfstetter, Elmar & Zamir, Shmuel
- 274-293 On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games
by Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco
- 294-320 Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships
by Tian, Guoqiang
October 2000, Volume 33, Issue 1
- 1-19 An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly
by Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B. & Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner
- 20-40 A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy
by Artale, Angelo & Gruner, Hans Peter
- 41-47 Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps
by Ewerhart, Christian
- 48-71 Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions
by de Frutos, M. Angeles
- 72-89 Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income
by Matsui, Akihiko & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 90-116 An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining
by Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard
- 117-125 Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games
by Renault, Regis
- 126-144 Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules
by Sprumont, Yves
- 145-158 In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation
by Warneryd, Karl
August 2000, Volume 32, Issue 2
- 157-182 Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach
by Sandroni, Alvaro
- 183-205 Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games
by Cressman, R.
- 206-218 Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable?
by Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh
- 219-219 The 17th Arne Ryde Symposium, "Focal Points--Coordination, Complexity, and Communication in Strategic Contexts"
by Andersson, Fredrik & Carlsson, Hans & Holm, Hakan
- 220-246 Variable-Frame Level-n Theory
by Bacharach, Michael & Stahl, Dale O.
- 247-262 Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games
by Bhaskar, V.
- 263-291 Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms
by Casajus, Andre
- 292-314 Gender-Based Focal Points
by Holm, Hakan J.
- 315-337 Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games
by Rankin, Frederick W. & Van Huyck, John B. & Battalio, Raymond C.
July 2000, Volume 32, Issue 1
- 1-24 Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W.
- 25-50 Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach
by Broseta, Bruno
- 51-66 Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects
by Ohseto, Shinji
- 67-84 The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games
by Orshan, Gooni & Zarzuelo, Jose M.
- 85-104 Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players
by Sethi, Rajiv
- 105-138 Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence
by Stahl, Dale O.
- 139-156 Characterization of the Owen Set of Linear Production Processes
by van Gellekom, J. R. G. & Potters, J. A. M. & Reijnierse, J. H. & Engel, M. C. & Tijs, S. H.
May 2000, Volume 31, Issue 2
- 165-173 On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once
by Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong
- 174-190 Perfect versus Imperfect Observability--An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result
by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland
- 191-219 Ambiguous Games
by Marinacci, Massimo
- 220-244 k-Price Auctions
by Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 245-261 Absorbing Team Games
by Solan, Eilon
- 262-293 Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game
by Weinberger, Catherine J.
- 294-302 Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems
by Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio
- 303-310 Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games
by Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv
- 311-323 Rationalizable Trade
by Morris, Stephen & Skiadas, Costis
- 324-329 Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
by Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
April 2000, Volume 31, Issue 1
- 1-25 One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures
by Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John
- 26-49 Cores of Inventory Centralization Games
by Hartman, Bruce C. & Dror, Moshe & Shaked, Moshe
- 50-96 Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations
by Kaniovski, Yuri M. & Kryazhimskii, Arkadii V. & Young, H. Peyton
- 97-105 Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability, and Coordination
by Mariotti, Marco
- 106-120 Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms
by Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 121-135 A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games
by Ui, Takashi
- 136-146 Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Limit Exchange Economies with Complete Markets: A Comparison between Two Models
by Codognato, Giulio
- 147-151 An Alternative Proof of an Equilibrium Existence Theorem in Exchange Economies with Indivisibilities
by Ma, Jinpeng
- 152-162 Fictitious Play in 2 x 3 Games
by Sela, Aner
February 2000, Volume 30, Issue 2
- 163-182 Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri
- 183-215 Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria
by Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David
- 216-227 A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures
by Fershtman, Chaim
- 228-247 Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy
by Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro
- 248-292 Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment
by Schotter, Andrew & Zheng, Wei & Snyder, Blaine
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