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Stability and Largeness of the Core

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  • Biswas, Amit K.
  • Parthasarathy, T.
  • Ravindran, G.

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  • Biswas, Amit K. & Parthasarathy, T. & Ravindran, G., 2001. "Stability and Largeness of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 227-237, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:227-237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peleg, Bezalel, 1992. "Axiomatizations of the core," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 397-412, Elsevier.
    2. Young, H.P., 1994. "Cost allocation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1193-1235, Elsevier.
    3. David Housman & (*), Lori Clark, 1998. "Note Core and monotonic allocation methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 611-616.
    4. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590, Elsevier.
    5. Biswas, A. K. & Parthasarathy, T. & Potters, J. A. M. & Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Large Cores and Exactness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-12, July.
    6. Amit K. Biswas & G. Ravindran & T. Parthasarathy, 2000. "Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 11-22.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Lars, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 537-547, May.
    2. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2008. "von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 81-98, October.
    3. K. C. Sivakumar & M. S. Gowda & G. Ravindran & Usha Mohan, 2020. "Preface: International conference on game theory and optimization, June 6–10, 2016, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 565-572, April.
    4. Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2012. "New characterizations for largeness of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 160-180.
    5. Kamal Jain & Rakesh Vohra, 2010. "Extendability and von Neuman–Morgenstern stability of the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 691-697, October.
    6. Hirai, Toshiyuki & Watanabe, Naoki, 2018. "von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: The existence proof," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-12.
    7. F. Martínez-de-Albéniz & Carles Rafels, 2007. "Minimal large sets for cooperative games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 15(2), pages 242-255, December.

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