Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances
Author
Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988.
"Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," LIDAM Reprints CORE 823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bruce Kogut, 1988. "Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 319-332, July.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999.
"Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84.
- Yannis Katsoutacos & David Ulph, 1998. "Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 333-357, September.
- J Michael Geringer & Louis Hebert, 1989. "Control and Performance of International Joint Ventures," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 20(2), pages 235-254, June.
- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004.
"Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments,"
Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 56(1), pages 72-89, January.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998.
"Sequential Investments and Options to Own,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 633-653, Winter.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CEPR Discussion Papers 1645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CESifo Working Paper Series 160, CESifo.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "Sequential investments and options to own," Munich Reprints in Economics 19327, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998.
"Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November.
- D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 93a18, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1356, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tarun Khanna, 1998. "The Scope of Alliances," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(3), pages 340-355, June.
- Gandal, Neil & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1993.
"Coordinating research through research joint ventures,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 173-193, June.
- Gandal, N. & Scotchmen, S., 1991. "Coordinating Research Through Research Joint Ventures," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv.
- Chiu, Y Stephen, 1998. "Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 882-901, September.
- Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 2000.
"One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-25, April.
- AMIR, Rabah & WOODERS, John, 1997. "One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles and research joint ventures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 1997. "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research Joint Ventures," Economics Series 43, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research Jointventures," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992.
"Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February.
- Bhattacharya, S. & Glazer, J. & Sappington, D., 1991. "Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures," Other publications TiSEM cd5b77e5-fb89-4321-b284-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bhattacharya, S. & Glazer, J. & Sappington, D., 1991. "Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures," Papers 9120, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Bhattacharya, S. & Glazer, J. & Sappington, D., 1991. "Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures," Discussion Paper 1991-20, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"The Management of Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209.
- Aghion, P. & Tirole, J., 1993. "On the Management of Innovation," Working papers 93-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "On the Management of Innovation," IDEI Working Papers 36, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999.
"Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
- Che, Y.K. & Hausch, D.B., 1997. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," Working papers 9714, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Strategic spillovers in patent races," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 139-146, March.
- David de Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386.
- Oliver Hart, 2001.
"Norms and the Theory of the Firm,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1923, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oliver Hart, 2001. "Norms and the Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 8286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999.
"Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," MPRA Paper 12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:cep:stitep:/1995/289 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
- Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-1306, December.
- De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 22-39, January.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
- Su, Han Chan & Kensinger, John W. & Keown, Arthur J. & Martin, John D., 1997. "Do strategic alliances create value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 199-221, November.
- Michael L. Katz, 1986. "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 527-543, Winter.
- Kamien, Morton I. & Zang, Israel, 2000. "Meet me halfway: research joint ventures and absorptive capacity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 995-1012, October.
- Jean‐Francois Hennart, 1988. "A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 361-374, July.
- Bruce Kogut, 1991. "Joint Ventures and the Option to Expand and Acquire," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 19-33, January.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
- repec:bla:jindec:v:46:y:1998:i:3:p:333-57 is not listed on IDEAS
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001.
"Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Silipo, Damiano B., 2008. "Incentives and forms of cooperation in research and development," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 101-119, June.
- Andreas Roider, 2004.
"Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 787-802, Winter.
- Roider, Andreas, 2002. "Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2014. "Joint Ventures and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm: a Review of the Literature," Working Papers 287, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2014.
- Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2017. "A New Cinderella Story: Joint Ventures And The Property Rights Theory Of The Firm," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 281-302, February.
- Castaneda, Marco A., 2006. "The hold-up problem in a repeated relationship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 953-970, September.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015.
"Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008.
"Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2006. "The Hold-up Problem," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 142, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," MPRA Paper 41730, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 44953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014.
"Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 91457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 336-339.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 9396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 45243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold‐Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012.
"The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," MPRA Paper 43407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:153-173. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.