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A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy

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  • Artale, Angelo
  • Gruner, Hans Peter

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  • Artale, Angelo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2000. "A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 20-40, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:1:p:20-40
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
    2. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    3. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
    4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    5. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    6. Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(2), pages 256-270.
    7. Peter Coughlin, 1986. "Elections and income redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 27-91, January.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    9. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-330, March.
    10. Condorcet, Marquis de, 1793. "Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number condorcet1793.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herschel I. Grossman, 2004. "Constitution or Conflict?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 29-42, February.
    2. Lars P. Feld & Justina A.V. Fischer & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2010. "The Effect Of Direct Democracy On Income Redistribution: Evidence For Switzerland," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(4), pages 817-840, October.
    3. Hans Grüner, 2009. "Inequality and Political Consensus," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 239-265, September.
    4. Markus Brückner & Hans Peter Grüner, 2020. "Economic growth and political extremism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 131-159, October.
    5. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. "Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 651-668, November.
    6. Markus Brueckner & Hans Peter Gruener, 2016. "Growth and Extremism," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2016-639, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    7. Luna Bellani & Heinrich Ursprung, 2016. "The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6189, CESifo.
    8. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Inequality and Political Consensus," CEPR Discussion Papers 4159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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