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Evolution and Mixed Strategies

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  • Binmore, Ken
  • Samuelson, Larry

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  • Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Evolution and Mixed Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 200-226, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:200-226
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    Cited by:

    1. Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020. "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 42-51.
    2. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    3. Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning in perturbed asymmetric games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-152, July.
    5. Daniel Wood, 2015. "Informal property rights as stable conventions in hawk-dove games with many players," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 849-873, September.
    6. Pradiptyo, Rimawan & Sasmitasiwi, Banoon & Sahadewo, Gumilang Aryo, 2011. "Evidence of homo economicus? Findings from experiment on evolutionary prisoners' dilemma game," MPRA Paper 30480, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "A general model of best response adaptation," Game Theory and Information 0303008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 641-667, September.
    9. Iñarra García, María Elena & Laruelle, Annick, 2011. "Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    10. Thomas Norman, 2010. "Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 167-182, August.
    11. Fisher, Eric ON. & Kakkar, Vikas, 2004. "On the evolution of comparative advantage in matching models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 169-193, October.
    12. William Casey & Jose Andre Morales & Evan Wright & Quanyan Zhu & Bud Mishra, 2016. "Compliance signaling games: toward modeling the deterrence of insider threats," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 318-349, September.

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