Contact information of Elsevier
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help
correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Content
April 2005, Volume 51, Issue 1
February 2005, Volume 50, Issue 2
- 129-142 Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims
by Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William
- 143-154 Two remarks on the inner core
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico
- 155-177 Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
by Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus
- 178-207 Network formation and social coordination
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando
- 208-224 Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence
by Harris, Christopher J. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. & Zame, William R.
- 225-254 Strategy-proof risk sharing
by Ju, Biung-Ghi
- 255-277 Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
by Mandler, Michael
- 278-311 Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
by Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno
- 312-331 A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
by Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv
- 332-365 Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games
by Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
January 2005, Volume 50, Issue 1
- 1-2 David Schmeidler
by Karni, Edi & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 3-27 Aggregate behavior and microdata
by Hildenbrand, Werner & Kneip, Alois
- 28-41 Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions
by Karni, Edi
- 42-57 Updating non-additive probabilities-- a geometric approach
by Lehrer, Ehud
- 58-78 Core convergence with asymmetric information
by McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 79-88 Strategic dropouts
by Orzach, Ram & Tauman, Yair
- 89-106 A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players
by Samet, Dov & Safra, Zvi
- 107-125 Decision-foundations for properties of nonadditive measures: general state spaces or general outcome spaces
by Wakker, Peter P.
November 2004, Volume 49, Issue 2
- 221-243 On coalitional semivalues
by Albizuri, M. Josune & Zarzuelo, Jose M.
- 244-259 Stochastic imitation in finite games
by Josephson, Jens & Matros, Alexander
- 260-287 Best response equivalence
by Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi
- 288-312 A model of the origins of basic property rights
by Muthoo, Abhinay
- 313-344 Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
- 345-362 Efficient spatial competition
by Stuart, Harborne Jr.
- 363-373 Program equilibrium
by Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 374-400 The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
by Vardy, Felix
- 401-423 An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
by Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix
- 424-434 Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
by Amoros, Pablo
October 2004, Volume 49, Issue 1
- 1-30 NP-completeness in hedonic games
by Ballester, Coralio
- 31-48 A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
by Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarkar, Palash
- 49-80 Dynamic interactive epistemology
by Board, Oliver
- 81-102 Non-excludable public good experiments
by Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu
- 103-116 Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
by Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
- 117-134 The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
by Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella
- 135-156 Rationalizability for social environments
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
- 157-170 Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 171-214 Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
by Stegeman, Mark & Rhode, Paul
- 215-219 Reviews and Comments
by Moldovanu, Benny
August 2004, Volume 48, Issue 2
- 203-222 Stochastic stability in a double auction
by Agastya, Murali
- 223-248 Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Kar, Anirban
- 249-270 In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
by Ehlers, Lars
- 271-291 Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
by Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak
- 292-320 Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
by Koessler, Frederic
- 321-336 Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
by Kuzmics, Christoph
- 337-354 Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
by Papai, Szilvia
- 355-384 Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
by Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J.
- 385-402 On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
by Shimoji, Makoto
- 403-414 Preparation
by Voorneveld, Mark
July 2004, Volume 48, Issue 1
- 1-17 Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
by Cantala, David
- 18-28 Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
by Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun
- 29-53 Successful uninformed bidding
by Hernando-Veciana, Angel
- 54-85 An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Moldovanu, Benny
- 86-93 The coalition structure core is accessible
by Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc
- 94-110 Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
by Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
- 111-123 Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
by Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 124-138 Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
by Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris C.
- 139-153 Bargaining with an agenda
by O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal
- 154-170 Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
by Schummer, James
- 171-200 Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games
by Slikker, Marco & Norde, Henk
May 2004, Volume 47, Issue 2
- 237-256 Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
by Bonanno, Giacomo
- 257-267 On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games
by Chun, Youngsub
- 268-298 A theory of sequential reciprocity
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg
- 299-324 Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
by Eso, Peter & Schummer, James
- 325-352 An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow
by Friedman, Eric & Shor, Mikhael & Shenker, Scott & Sopher, Barry
- 353-388 Random-player games
by Milchtaich, Igal
- 389-403 Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
by Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva
- 404-420 Endogenous price leadership
by van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak
- 421-452 Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
by Westermark, Andreas
- 453-453 Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 240-259]
by Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone
April 2004, Volume 47, Issue 1
- 1-35 Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies
by Al-Najjar, Nabil I.
- 36-71 Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
by Archer, Aaron & Feigenbaum, Joan & Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Sami, Rahul & Shenker, Scott
- 72-86 Observational learning under imperfect information
by Celen, Bogachan & Kariv, Shachar
- 87-103 Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
by Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov
- 104-123 Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
by Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 124-156 Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
- 157-171 Belief-based equilibrium
by Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 172-199 Games with espionage
by Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat
- 200-220 Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
by Spiegler, Ran
- 221-233 Individually rational pure strategies in large games
by Stanford, William
February 2004, Volume 46, Issue 2
- 221-239 Does observation influence learning?
by Armantier, Olivier
- 240-259 Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games
by Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone
- 260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity
by Cox, James C.
- 282-303 Learning to play Bayesian games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K.
- 304-324 Learning with perfect information
by Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori
- 325-347 A characterization of strategic complementarities
by Echenique, Federico
- 348-364 Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities
by Echenique, Federico
- 365-382 A model of noisy introspection
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A.
- 383-397 Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions
by Kim, Jinwoo & Che, Yeon-Koo
- 398-409 Learning by matching patterns
by Lambson, Val E. & Probst, Daniel A.
- 410-424 The averaging mechanism
by Naeve-Steinweg, E.
- 425-433 A note on one-shot public mediated talk
by Di Tillio, Alfredo
January 2004, Volume 46, Issue 1
- 1-22 Word-of-mouth learning
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew
- 23-40 Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium
by Burton, Anthony & Sefton, Martin
- 41-54 A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy
by De Sinopoli, Francesco
- 55-75 When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
by Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben
- 76-87 Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 88-114 Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods
by Olszewski, Wojciech
- 115-128 On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment
by Phelan, Christopher
- 129-142 An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players
by Safra, Zvi & Samet, Dov
- 143-173 Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E.
- 174-188 The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions
by Yokoo, Makoto & Sakurai, Yuko & Matsubara, Shigeo
- 189-198 The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents
by Halevy, Yoram
- 199-212 Implementation in the many-to-many matching market
by Sotomayor, Marilda
- 213-214 Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999
by Gilboa, Itzhak
- 215-218 Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3: Edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, Elsevier, New York, 2002
by O'Neill, Barry
- 219-219 Erratum to "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly": [Games Econ. Behav. 43 (1) (2003) 57-85]
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit
November 2003, Volume 45, Issue 2
- 271-277 Introduction to the special issue in memory of Robert W. Rosenthal
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Wilson, Robert
- 278-295 Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games
by Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 296-328 Equilibrium selection in bargaining models
by Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton
- 329-346 Bayesian learning in social networks
by Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar
- 347-368 Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game
by Gneezy, Uri & Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E.
- 369-374 A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem
by Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J.
- 375-394 Regret-based continuous-time dynamics
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
- 395-409 Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions
by Maskin, Eric & Riley, John
- 410-433 Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 434-441 Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
by Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel
- 442-464 Monopolists and viscous demand
by Radner, Roy & Richardson, Thomas J.
- 465-487 Walrasian bargaining
by Yildiz, Muhamet
- 488-497 Auction Theory: By Vijay Krishna. Academic Press, 2002
by Weber, Robert J.
October 2003, Volume 45, Issue 1
- 1-1 Introduction to the Games 2000 Special Issue
by Kalai, Ehud
- 2-14 Presidential address
by Aumann, Robert J.
- 15-18 Introductory remarks on the history of game theory
by Arrow, Kenneth J.
- 19-37 How to play (3 x 3)-games.: A strategy method experiment
by Selten, Reinhard & Abbink, Klaus & Buchta, Joachim & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
- 38-72 Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
- 73-96 Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium
by Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton
- 97-113 Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 114-131 A computer scientist looks at game theory
by Halpern, Joseph Y.
- 132-152 On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium
by Hu, Xingwei & Shapley, Lloyd S.
- 153-170 On authority distributions in organizations: controls
by Hu, Xingwei & Shapley, Lloyd S.
- 171-180 Costly Nash paths
by Kannai, Yakar
- 181-221 Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
by Koller, Daphne & Milch, Brian
- 222-241 Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 242-269 Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis
by Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard
August 2003, Volume 44, Issue 2
- 195-216 Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining
by Abreu, Dilip & Sethi, Rajiv
- 217-226 The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games
by Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C.
- 227-250 Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring
by Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael
- 251-271 How noise matters
by Blume, Lawrence E.
- 272-285 The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly
by Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 286-310 Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts
by Eliaz, Kfir
- 311-331 Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game
by Nunez, Marina & Rafels, Carles
- 332-342 Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences
by Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- 343-378 Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information
by Sandholm, William H.
- 379-389 The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium
by Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji
- 390-411 Strategic pattern recognition--experimental evidence
by Sonsino, Doron & Sirota, Julia
- 412-427 An implementation of the Owen value
by Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo
July 2003, Volume 44, Issue 1
- 1-25 Learning under limited information
by Chen, Yan & Khoroshilov, Yuri
- 26-53 Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation
by Dickhaut, John & Ledyard, Margaret & Mukherji, Arijit & Sapra, Haresh
- 54-76 Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations
by Kittsteiner, Thomas
- 77-97 Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets
by Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin
- 98-113 Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness
by Squintani, Francesco
- 114-133 Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra
by Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 134-144 'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game
by Weber, Roberto A.
- 145-171 Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games
by Weizsacker, Georg
- 172-182 A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David
- 183-194 Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
by Paz Espinosa, Maria & Macho-Stadler, Ines
May 2003, Volume 43, Issue 2
- 175-188 Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions
by Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher
- 189-195 Adaptive play with spatial sampling
by Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe
- 196-213 Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities
by Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas
- 214-238 The effectiveness of English auctions
by Neeman, Zvika
- 239-265 Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game
by Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Nicholas, Thomas E.
- 266-295 Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information
by Rusmevichientong, Paat & Van Roy, Benjamin
- 296-311 Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages
by Westermark, Andreas
- 312-321 Unraveling in first-price auction
by Bag, Parimal Kanti
- 322-325 The museum pass game and its value
by Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, Israel
April 2003, Volume 43, Issue 1
- 1-27 Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules
by Ehlers, Lars
- 28-43 Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies
by Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 44-56 Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing
by Flam, S. D. & Jourani, A.
- 57-85 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit
- 86-106 Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame
by Napel, Stefan
- 107-136 On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games
by O'Connell, Thomas C. & Stearns, Richard E.
- 137-152 Can you guess the game you are playing?
by Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard
- 153-173 Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W.
February 2003, Volume 42, Issue 2
- 183-207 Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
by Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor & Wooders, John
- 208-234 Admissibility and common belief
by Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin
- 235-252 Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning
by Buskens, Vincent
- 253-266 A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy
by Kumar, Alok & Shubik, Martin
- 267-280 Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome
by Rath, Kali P. & Zhao, Gongyun
- 281-299 Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play
by Schmidt, David & Shupp, Robert & Walker, James M. & Ostrom, Elinor
- 300-306 An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games
by Shmaya, Eran & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
- 307-314 Strong comparative statics of equilibria
by Echenique, Federico & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 315-318 A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
by Olszewski, Wojciech
- 319-326 Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain
by Wolinsky, Asher
- 327-332 The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp
by Reny, Philip J.
January 2003, Volume 42, Issue 1
- 1-24 Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments
by Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori
- 25-47 Strategic learning in games with symmetric information
by Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas
- 48-74 Hiding information in electoral competition
by Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan
- 75-90 The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations
by Karotkin, Drora & Schaps, Mary
- 91-100 Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
by Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi
- 101-115 A wide range no-regret theorem
by Lehrer, Ehud
- 116-136 Learning by not doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning
by Merlo, Antonio & Schotter, Andrew
- 137-155 The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games
by Morelli, Massimo & Montero, Maria
- 156-171 Cost allocation in spanning network enterprises with stochastic connection costs
by Suijs, Jeroen
- 172-179 Risk taking in selection contests
by Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G.
November 2002, Volume 41, Issue 2
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamebe14.html
