Contact information of Elsevier
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help
correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Content
April 2004, Volume 47, Issue 1
- 72-86 Observational learning under imperfect information
by Celen, Bogachan & Kariv, Shachar
- 87-103 Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
by Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov
- 104-123 Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
by Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 124-156 Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
- 157-171 Belief-based equilibrium
by Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 172-199 Games with espionage
by Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat
- 200-220 Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
by Spiegler, Ran
- 221-233 Individually rational pure strategies in large games
by Stanford, William
February 2004, Volume 46, Issue 2
- 221-239 Does observation influence learning?
by Armantier, Olivier
- 240-259 Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games
by Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone
- 260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity
by Cox, James C.
- 282-303 Learning to play Bayesian games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K.
- 304-324 Learning with perfect information
by Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori
- 325-347 A characterization of strategic complementarities
by Echenique, Federico
- 348-364 Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities
by Echenique, Federico
- 365-382 A model of noisy introspection
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A.
- 383-397 Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions
by Kim, Jinwoo & Che, Yeon-Koo
- 398-409 Learning by matching patterns
by Lambson, Val E. & Probst, Daniel A.
- 410-424 The averaging mechanism
by Naeve-Steinweg, E.
- 425-433 A note on one-shot public mediated talk
by Di Tillio, Alfredo
January 2004, Volume 46, Issue 1
- 1-22 Word-of-mouth learning
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew
- 23-40 Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium
by Burton, Anthony & Sefton, Martin
- 41-54 A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy
by De Sinopoli, Francesco
- 55-75 When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
by Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben
- 76-87 Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 88-114 Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods
by Olszewski, Wojciech
- 115-128 On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment
by Phelan, Christopher
- 129-142 An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players
by Safra, Zvi & Samet, Dov
- 143-173 Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E.
- 174-188 The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions
by Yokoo, Makoto & Sakurai, Yuko & Matsubara, Shigeo
- 189-198 The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents
by Halevy, Yoram
- 199-212 Implementation in the many-to-many matching market
by Sotomayor, Marilda
- 213-214 Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999
by Gilboa, Itzhak
- 215-218 Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3: Edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, Elsevier, New York, 2002
by O'Neill, Barry
- 219-219 Erratum to "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly": [Games Econ. Behav. 43 (1) (2003) 57-85]
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit
November 2003, Volume 45, Issue 2
- 271-277 Introduction to the special issue in memory of Robert W. Rosenthal
by Postlewaite, Andrew & Wilson, Robert
- 278-295 Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games
by Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 296-328 Equilibrium selection in bargaining models
by Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton
- 329-346 Bayesian learning in social networks
by Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar
- 347-368 Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game
by Gneezy, Uri & Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E.
- 369-374 A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem
by Govindan, Srihari & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J.
- 375-394 Regret-based continuous-time dynamics
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
- 395-409 Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions
by Maskin, Eric & Riley, John
- 410-433 Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 434-441 Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
by Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel
- 442-464 Monopolists and viscous demand
by Radner, Roy & Richardson, Thomas J.
- 465-487 Walrasian bargaining
by Yildiz, Muhamet
- 488-497 Auction Theory: By Vijay Krishna. Academic Press, 2002
by Weber, Robert J.
October 2003, Volume 45, Issue 1
- 1-1 Introduction to the Games 2000 Special Issue
by Kalai, Ehud
- 2-14 Presidential address
by Aumann, Robert J.
- 15-18 Introductory remarks on the history of game theory
by Arrow, Kenneth J.
- 19-37 How to play (3 x 3)-games.: A strategy method experiment
by Selten, Reinhard & Abbink, Klaus & Buchta, Joachim & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
- 38-72 Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano
- 73-96 Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium
by Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton
- 97-113 Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 114-131 A computer scientist looks at game theory
by Halpern, Joseph Y.
- 132-152 On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium
by Hu, Xingwei & Shapley, Lloyd S.
- 153-170 On authority distributions in organizations: controls
by Hu, Xingwei & Shapley, Lloyd S.
- 171-180 Costly Nash paths
by Kannai, Yakar
- 181-221 Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
by Koller, Daphne & Milch, Brian
- 222-241 Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
by McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 242-269 Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis
by Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard
August 2003, Volume 44, Issue 2
- 195-216 Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining
by Abreu, Dilip & Sethi, Rajiv
- 217-226 The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games
by Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C.
- 227-250 Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring
by Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael
- 251-271 How noise matters
by Blume, Lawrence E.
- 272-285 The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly
by Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 286-310 Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts
by Eliaz, Kfir
- 311-331 Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game
by Nunez, Marina & Rafels, Carles
- 332-342 Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences
by Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- 343-378 Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information
by Sandholm, William H.
- 379-389 The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium
by Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji
- 390-411 Strategic pattern recognition--experimental evidence
by Sonsino, Doron & Sirota, Julia
- 412-427 An implementation of the Owen value
by Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo
July 2003, Volume 44, Issue 1
- 1-25 Learning under limited information
by Chen, Yan & Khoroshilov, Yuri
- 26-53 Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation
by Dickhaut, John & Ledyard, Margaret & Mukherji, Arijit & Sapra, Haresh
- 54-76 Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations
by Kittsteiner, Thomas
- 77-97 Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets
by Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin
- 98-113 Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness
by Squintani, Francesco
- 114-133 Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra
by Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 134-144 'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game
by Weber, Roberto A.
- 145-171 Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games
by Weizsacker, Georg
- 172-182 A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game
by Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David
- 183-194 Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
by Paz Espinosa, Maria & Macho-Stadler, Ines
May 2003, Volume 43, Issue 2
- 175-188 Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions
by Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher
- 189-195 Adaptive play with spatial sampling
by Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe
- 196-213 Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities
by Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas
- 214-238 The effectiveness of English auctions
by Neeman, Zvika
- 239-265 Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game
by Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Nicholas, Thomas E.
- 266-295 Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information
by Rusmevichientong, Paat & Van Roy, Benjamin
- 296-311 Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages
by Westermark, Andreas
- 312-321 Unraveling in first-price auction
by Bag, Parimal Kanti
- 322-325 The museum pass game and its value
by Ginsburgh, Victor & Zang, Israel
April 2003, Volume 43, Issue 1
- 1-27 Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules
by Ehlers, Lars
- 28-43 Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies
by Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 44-56 Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing
by Flam, S. D. & Jourani, A.
- 57-85 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit
- 86-106 Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame
by Napel, Stefan
- 107-136 On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games
by O'Connell, Thomas C. & Stearns, Richard E.
- 137-152 Can you guess the game you are playing?
by Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard
- 153-173 Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W.
February 2003, Volume 42, Issue 2
- 183-207 Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
by Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor & Wooders, John
- 208-234 Admissibility and common belief
by Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin
- 235-252 Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning
by Buskens, Vincent
- 253-266 A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy
by Kumar, Alok & Shubik, Martin
- 267-280 Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome
by Rath, Kali P. & Zhao, Gongyun
- 281-299 Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play
by Schmidt, David & Shupp, Robert & Walker, James M. & Ostrom, Elinor
- 300-306 An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games
by Shmaya, Eran & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
- 307-314 Strong comparative statics of equilibria
by Echenique, Federico & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 315-318 A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
by Olszewski, Wojciech
- 319-326 Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain
by Wolinsky, Asher
- 327-332 The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Vol. 1, 720 pp; Vol. 2, 672 pp
by Reny, Philip J.
January 2003, Volume 42, Issue 1
- 1-24 Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments
by Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori
- 25-47 Strategic learning in games with symmetric information
by Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas
- 48-74 Hiding information in electoral competition
by Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan
- 75-90 The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations
by Karotkin, Drora & Schaps, Mary
- 91-100 Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
by Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi
- 101-115 A wide range no-regret theorem
by Lehrer, Ehud
- 116-136 Learning by not doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning
by Merlo, Antonio & Schotter, Andrew
- 137-155 The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games
by Morelli, Massimo & Montero, Maria
- 156-171 Cost allocation in spanning network enterprises with stochastic connection costs
by Suijs, Jeroen
- 172-179 Risk taking in selection contests
by Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G.
November 2002, Volume 41, Issue 2
- 169-191 The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements
by Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J.
- 192-205 Welfare reducing licensing
by Fauli-Oller, Ramon & Sandonis, Joel
- 206-226 How to play with a biased coin?
by Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas
- 227-264 Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
by Hart, Sergiu
- 265-291 On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison
- 292-308 Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions
by Miyagawa, Eiichi
- 309-321 Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel
by Montero, Maria
- 322-343 A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme
by Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans
- 344-364 Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
by Warneryd, Karl
October 2002, Volume 41, Issue 1
- 1-25 The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study
by Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie
- 26-45 Fairness and learning: an experimental examination
by Cooper, David J. & Stockman, Carol Kraker
- 46-60 On (un)knots and dynamics in games
by Demichelis, Stefano & Germano, Fabrizio
- 61-78 Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality
by Mattsson, Lars-Goran & Weibull, Jorgen W.
- 79-102 Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions
by Simon, Robert Samuel
- 103-119 Calibration and Bayesian learning
by Turdaliev, Nurlan
- 120-140 On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes
by Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal
- 141-160 Eliciting information from multiple experts
by Wolinsky, Asher
- 161-164 A note on k-price auctions with complete information
by Tauman, Yair
- 165-168 Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games Econ. Behav. 38 (2002) 28-51]
by Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi
August 2002, Volume 40, Issue 2
- 153-184 An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
by Ania, Ana B. & Troger, Thomas & Wambach, Achim
- 185-202 Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
by Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc
- 203-231 Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach
by Charness, Gary & Haruvy, Ernan
- 232-269 Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition
by Droste, Edward & Hommes, Cars & Tuinstra, Jan
- 270-298 A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching
by Kosfeld, Michael & Droste, Edward & Voorneveld, Mark
- 299-321 Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
by Sekiguchi, Tadashi
- 322-338 A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
by Perea, Andres
July 2002, Volume 40, Issue 1
- 1-24 What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence
by Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise
- 25-43 The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining
by Chun, Youngsub
- 44-76 Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox
by Hehenkamp, Burkhard
- 77-98 Contractual Signaling in a Market Environment
by Inderst, Roman
- 99-122 The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
by Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi
- 123-146 An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games
by Morgan, John & Sefton, Martin
- 147-149 A Challenge to Formal Modeling of Poker and Bridge
by Dahl, Fredrik A.
- 150-152 In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi: Memory from China
by Tang, Fang-Fang
May 2002, Volume 39, Issue 2
- 177-205 Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence
by Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia
- 206-214 Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess
by Ewerhart, Christian
- 215-236 Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case
by Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O.
- 237-281 Chores
by LaCasse, Chantale & Ponsati, Clara & Barham, Vicky
- 282-291 Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information and with Observable Delay
by Normann, Hans-Theo
- 292-308 Bargaining and Bargaining Sets
by Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv
- 309-321 In Defense of DEFECT
by Volij, Oscar
April 2002, Volume 39, Issue 1
- 1-27 Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk
by Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick
- 28-53 Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
by Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack
- 54-70 (Sophisticated) Stable Sets in Exchange Economies
by Greenberg, Joseph & Luo, Xiao & Oladi, Reza & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 71-90 Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection
by Juang, Wei-Torng
- 91-110 Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 111-136 Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players
by Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal
- 137-166 Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits, and Welfare
by Sgroi, Daniel
- 167-174 Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium
by Ryan, Matthew J.
February 2002, Volume 38, Issue 2
- 201-230 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
by Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O.
- 231-239 Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property
by Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Pere Villar, Joan
- 240-264 To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets
by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo
- 265-277 Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games
by Kar, Anirban
- 278-305 Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency
by Jude Kline, J.
- 306-317 Perfect Information and Potential Games
by Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
- 318-346 Stability and Segregation in Group Formation
by Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal
- 347-361 Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems
by Miyagawa, Eiichi
- 362-399 Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
by Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
January 2002, Volume 38, Issue 1
- 1-18 The Scholarship Assignment Problem
by Amoros, Pablo & Corchon, Luis C. & Moreno, Bernardo
- 19-27 Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions
by Bikhchandani, Sushil & Haile, Philip A. & Riley, John G.
- 28-51 Bargaining and Boldness
by Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi
- 52-88 Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment
by Dale, Donald J. & Morgan, John & Rosenthal, Robert W.
- 89-117 Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van den Elzen, Antoon
- 118-126 The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core
by Muller, Alfred & Scarsini, Marco & Shaked, Moshe
- 127-155 How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games
by Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H.
- 156-175 Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games
by Van Huyck, John B. & Wildenthal, John M. & Battalio, Raymond C.
- 176-199 Starting Small and Commitment
by Watson, Joel
- 200-200 In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi (1920-2000)
by Shubik, Martin
November 2001, Volume 37, Issue 2
- 243-258 Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems
by Calvo, E. & Santos, J. C.
- 259-294 A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries
by Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar
- 295-320 Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers
by Gale, Douglas
- 321-339 Alternative Semantics for Unawareness
by Halpern, Joseph Y.
- 340-366 A Behavioral Learning Process in Games
by Laslier, Jean-Francois & Topol, Richard & Walliser, Bernard
- 367-387 Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
by Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
- 388-414 Player Types and Self-Impression Management in Dictatorship Games: Two Experiments
by Murnighan, J. Keith & Oesch, John M. & Pillutla, Madan
- 415-424 Game Theory via Revealed Preferences
by Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin