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On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games

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  • De Sinopoli, Francesco

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  • De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:270-286
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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
    3. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 128-144.
    2. Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July.
    3. Pimienta, Carlos, 2010. "Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 364-365, May.
    4. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, February.
    5. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2010. "Costly network formation and regular equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 492-497, July.
    6. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    7. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 889-909, April.
    8. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, 2022. "The Trembling Chairman Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 51-56.

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