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Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010. "Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, September.
  2. Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
  3. Stefanie Brilon, 2010. "Job Assignment with Multivariate Skills," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  4. Nafziger, Julia, 2008. "Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 5/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  5. Wane, Waly, 2004. "The quality of foreign aid : country selectivity or donors incentives?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3325, The World Bank.
  6. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2011. "Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  8. Ferreira, Priscila, 2009. "The determinants of promotions and firm separations," ISER Working Paper Series 2009-11, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
  9. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  10. Tom Ahn & Jason Niven & Andrew Veilleux, 2021. "How long have you been waiting? Explaining the role of irrelevant information in the promotion of U.S. Navy officers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(2), pages 604-614.
  11. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, April.
  12. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up‐or‐out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325, June.
  13. Hans K. Hvide & Yanren Zhang, 2021. "Too big to succeed? Overstaffing in firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 784-798, November.
  14. Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
  15. Karachiwalla, Naureen & Park, Albert, 2017. "Promotion incentives in the public sector: Evidence from Chinese schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 109-128.
  16. Chin‐Hwa Lu & Chung‐Hua Shen, 2020. "Do networks or performance impact the promotion of Chinese officials? Evidence from prefecture‐level cities," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 539-573, October.
  17. Herbertz, Claus & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013. "When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 188-191.
  18. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2013. "Yes Men in Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 621-659, December.
  19. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2008. "Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects, and the Earnings Dynamics of American Executives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 287-310, April.
  20. Matthias Kräkel, 2014. "Sandbagging," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(3), pages 263-284, June.
  21. Steffen Altmann & Armin Falk & Matthias Wibral, 2012. "Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 149-174.
  22. David L. Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2012. "Job Allocation Rules and Sorting Efficiency: Experimental Outcomes in a Peter Principle Environment," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(3), pages 842-859, January.
  23. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
  24. Kräkel, Matthias, 2012. "Competitive careers as a way to mediocracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 76-87.
  25. Alan Benson & Danielle Li & Kelly Shue, 2019. "Promotions and the Peter Principle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(4), pages 2085-2134.
  26. Kiyotaki, Fumi, 2010. "Hold-up and the inefficiency of job assignments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 36-44, March.
  27. Eric W. Chan & Jeremy B. Lill & Victor S. Maas, 2023. "Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 493-530, May.
  28. Hvide, Hans K. & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 523-547, October.
  30. Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Finance 0311003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2011. "Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," FMG Discussion Papers dp690, Financial Markets Group.
  32. Jiajing Sun & Michael Cole & Zhiyuan Huang & Shouyang Wang, 2019. "Chinese leadership: Provincial perspectives on promotion and performance," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 37(4), pages 750-772, June.
  33. Fetta, A.G. & Harper, P.R. & Knight, V.A. & Vieira, I.T. & Williams, J.E., 2012. "On the Peter Principle: An agent based investigation into the consequential effects of social networks and behavioural factors," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(9), pages 2898-2910.
  34. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
  35. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
  36. Brice Corgnet & Ludivine Martin & Peguy Ndodjang & Angela Sutan, 2015. "On the Merit of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact with Incentive Setting," Working Papers 15-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  37. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-Ángel, 2003. "Internal Promotion Versus External Recruitment: Evidence in Industrial Plants," Working Papers 0303, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Mar 2003.
  39. Dur, Robert & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Social exchange and common agency in organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-63, January.
  40. James Ang & Rebel Cole & Daniel Lawson, 2010. "The Role of Owner in Capital Structure Decisions: An Analysis of Single-Owner Corporations," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 14(3), pages 1-36, Fall.
  41. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
  42. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 413, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  43. Jiahua Che & Kim‐Sau Chung & Xue Qiao, 2021. "Career Concerns, Beijing Style," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1513-1535, November.
  44. Edward P. Lazear, 2004. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 141-163, February.
  45. Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Optimal Promotion Policies with the Looking-Glass Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(4), pages 857-878, October.
  46. Jin‐Hyuk Kim, 2011. "Peer Performance Evaluation: Information Aggregation Approach," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 565-587, June.
  47. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
  48. Jakob Infuehr & Sebastian Kronenberger, 2023. "The Impact of Job Similarity Along the Career Path on the Firm’s Promotion Strategy," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 149-172, June.
  49. Isabella Grabner & Frank Moers, 2013. "Managers' Choices of Performance Measures in Promotion Decisions: An Analysis of Alternative Job Assignments," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 1187-1220, December.
  50. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, 2020. "The Peter and Dilbert Principles applied to academe," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 115-132, June.
  51. Volker Meier, 2004. "Setting Incentives: Temporary Performance Premiums versus Promotion Tournaments," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 18(4), pages 661-674, December.
  52. Jiang, Kun & Wang, Susheng, 2022. "Internal labor markets with two types of promotion and two tiers of salary: theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  53. Geir H. Bjertnæs, 2012. "Promotion rat race and public policy," Discussion Papers 686, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
  54. Krakel, Matthias, 2003. "U-type versus J-type tournaments as alternative solutions to the unverifiability problem," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 359-380, June.
  55. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
  56. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  57. ASUYAMA Yoko & OWAN Hideo, 2024. "People Management Skills, Senior Leadership Skills and the Peter Principle," Discussion papers 24037, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  58. Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  59. Cheng, Yuan & Chang, Meng & Xue, Yanbo, 2020. "A computational study of promotion dynamics and organizational efficiency," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 560(C).
  60. Garcia-Martinez, Jose A., 2012. "An Unexpected Role of Local Selectivity in Social Promotion," MPRA Paper 36324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  61. Geir Bjertnaes, 2012. "Promotion Rat Race and Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3781, CESifo.
  62. Samuel A Swift & Don A Moore & Zachariah S Sharek & Francesca Gino, 2013. "Inflated Applicants: Attribution Errors in Performance Evaluation by Professionals," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(7), pages 1-15, July.
  63. Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Promotion without Commitment: Signaling, Time Inconsistency and Decentralization of the Firm," ISER Discussion Paper 0843, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  64. Pawel Sobkowicz, 2010. "Dilbert-Peter Model of Organization Effectiveness: Computer Simulations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 13(4), pages 1-4.
  65. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments In Market Equilibrium," Working Paper 1193, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  66. Brilon, Stefanie, 2015. "Job assignment with multivariate skills and the Peter Principle," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 112-121.
  67. José Ángel Zúñiga Vicente & José David Vicente Lorente, 2003. "Assessing the Structural Change of Strategic Mobility Determinants Under Hypercompetitive Environments," Working Papers 0302, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Feb 2003.
  68. Edward P. Lazear, 2001. "The Peter Principle: Promotions and Declining Productivity," NBER Working Papers 8094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  69. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  70. Joao Ricardo Faria & Peter McAdam, 2014. "Does Tenure Make Researchers Less Productive? The Case of the “Specialist”," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0514, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  71. repec:cte:wbrepe:6526 is not listed on IDEAS
  72. Rocio Bonet & Tor Eriksson & Jaime Ortega, 2019. "Up for Review: Unravelling the Link between Formal Evaluations and Performance‐Based Rewards," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 108-137, January.
  73. Leonora Risse, 2020. "Leaning in: Is higher confidence the key to women's career advancement?," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 23(1), pages 43-77.
  74. Kräkel, Matthias, 2002. "U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  75. Acosta, Pablo, 2010. "Promotion dynamics the Peter Principle: Incumbents vs. external hires," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 975-986, December.
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