Internal labor markets with two types of promotion and two tiers of salary: theory and evidence from China
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DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2022.101756
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More about this item
Keywords
Internal labor market; Linear contract; Two-tier salary; Discretionary promotion; Rule-based promotion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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