Dilbert-Peter Model of Organization Effectiveness: Computer Simulations
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Cited by:
- Davide Secchi & Raffaello Seri, 2017. "Controlling for false negatives in agent-based models: a review of power analysis in organizational research," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 94-121, March.
- Cheng, Yuan & Chang, Meng & Xue, Yanbo, 2020. "A computational study of promotion dynamics and organizational efficiency," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 560(C).
- Sobkowicz, Pawel, 2016. "Agent based model of effects of task allocation strategies in flat organizations," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 458(C), pages 17-30.
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Keywords
Organization Productivity; Peter Principle; Agent Based Modeling;All these keywords.
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