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Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives

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  • Melero Martín, Eduardo

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

In this paper, I analyse the relationship between job-related training and career progress of workers. Most theories of career paths and task assignment rely on human capital accumulation. Therefore, it seems natural to start assessing the empirical validity of such theories by analysing the effect of training on the career progress of an individual. I use the sample of workers from twelve waves of the BHPS (1991-2002) to study the impact of training over the probability of making a career-improving move, using both between-groups and within-group panel data estimators. I find that job-related training received by female workers boosts significantly their chances of being promoted in the next future, while leaving virtually unaffected the chances of male workers. Then, I investigate how do training and promotion jointly influence wage growth. The results show that their interaction is, if any, positive. Additional evidence confirms that the career path of female workers seem to be importantly affected by the market value of their human capital, while that of men might be more affected by the role of promotion systems as mechanisms devised to provide incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1377
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    Cited by:

    1. Panos, Sousounis, 2009. "The Impact of Work-Related Training on Employee Earnings: Evidence from Great Britain," MPRA Paper 14262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sara Serra, 2016. "Temporary contracts' transitions: the role of training and institutions," Working Papers w201611, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    3. Alison Booth & Mark L. Bryan, 2006. "Training, Minimum Wages and the Earnings Distribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 537, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    4. Filipe Almeida-Santos & Yekaterina Chzhen & Karen Mumford, 2010. "Employee training and wage dispersion: white- and blue-collar workers in Britain," Research in Labor Economics, in: Jobs, Training, and Worker Well-being, pages 35-60, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    5. Carla Haelermans & Lex Borghans, 2012. "Wage Effects of On-the-Job Training: A Meta-Analysis," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 50(3), pages 502-528, September.
    6. Almeida-Santos, Filipe & Mumford, Karen A., 2006. "Employee Training, Wage Dispersion and Equality in Britain," IZA Discussion Papers 2276, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Julia Lang, 2012. "The Aims of Lifelong Learning: Age-Related Effects of Training on Wages and Job Security," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 478, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    8. Lang, Julia, 2012. "The aims of lifelong learning: Age-related effects of training on wages and job security," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62073, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    human capital; training; task allocation; careers; internal labour markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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