Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions
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Cited by:
- Angelo Antoci & Irene Brunetti & Pierluigi Sacco & Mauro Sodini, 2021. "Student evaluation of teaching, social influence dynamics, and teachers’ choices: An evolutionary model," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 325-348, January.
- Christian Lukas & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2008. "Trust and Adaptive Learning in Implicit Contracts," FEMM Working Papers 08017, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Claudia Toma & Fabrizio Butera, 2015. "Cooperation versus competition effects on information sharing and use in group decision-making," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 9(9), pages 455-467, September.
- Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2016.
"The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 399-427, November.
- Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Phillipe, 2009. "Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants," Working Papers 2009-21, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Claudia Toma & Fabrizio Butera, 2015. "Cooperation versus Competition Effects on Information Sharing and Us in Group Decision Making," Working Papers CEB 15-016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Boris Maciejovsky & David V. Budescu, 2020. "Too Much Trust in Group Decisions: Uncovering Hidden Profiles by Groups and Markets," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(6), pages 1497-1514, November.
- Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "Patents, Search of Prior Art, and Revelation of Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10489, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Rothkopf, Alexander & Pibernik, Richard, 2016. "Maverick buying: Eliminate, participate, leverage?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 77-89.
- Vanessa Dayeh & Ben W. Morrison, 2020. "The Effect of Perceived Competence and Competitive Environment on Team Decision-Making in the Hidden-Profile Paradigm," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1181-1205, December.
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