When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.015
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Cited by:
- Michael Babington & Sebastian J. Goerg & Carl Kitchens, 2020.
"Do Tournaments With Superstars Encourage or Discourage Competition?,"
Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(1), pages 44-63, January.
- Babington, Michael & Goerg, Sebastian J. & Kitchens, Carl, 2017. "Do Tournaments with Superstars Encourage or Discourage Competition?," IZA Discussion Papers 10755, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lorens A. Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2023. "Team Diversity and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2497-2516, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incentives; Favoritism; Nepotism; Tournaments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
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