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Credulity, lies, and costly talk
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Cited by:
- Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2008.
"Paradox of Credibility,"
Microeconomics Working Papers
22267, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2008. "Paradox of Credibility," MPRA Paper 7443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brown, Martin & Schmitz, Jan & Zehnder, Christian, 2024.
"Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 423-455.
- Martin Brown & Jan Schmitz & Christian Zehnder, 2023. "Communication and Hidden Action: A Credit Market Experiment," Working Papers 23.02, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010.
"Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions,"
Working Papers
10.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Biased experts, costly lies, and binary decisions," IEW - Working Papers 496, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021.
"Relational communication,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2018. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2019. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12a, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li, 2019. "Relational Communication," Papers 1901.05645, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
- Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Persson, Petra, 2018.
"Attention manipulation and information overload,"
Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 78-106, May.
- Persson, Petra, 2013. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," Working Paper Series 995, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Petra Persson, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," NBER Working Papers 23823, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Petra, 2017. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," CEPR Discussion Papers 12297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Wang, Bo & Zheng, Suli, 2024. "Information manipulation and majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 242(C).
- Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022.
"Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
- Ottaviani, Marco & Loseto, Marco, 2018. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 13224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Post-Print hal-03874153, HAL.
- Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03874153, HAL.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gottardi, Piero, 2014.
"Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 24-44.
- Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies," Working Papers 2008_37, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/11, European University Institute.
- Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2336, CESifo.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gottardi, Piero, 2008. "Markets for information : of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies," UC3M Working papers. Economics we080201, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Navin Kartik, 2009.
"Strategic Communication with Lying Costs,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
- Navin Kartik, 2008. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," 2008 Meeting Papers 350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962239, HAL.
- Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2021.
"Malleability of Preferences for Honesty,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
9033, CESifo.
- Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Fabian Kosse, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Working Papers 2021-021, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 282, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Falk, Armin & Abeler, Johannes & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of preferences for honesty," CEPR Discussion Papers 16164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 296, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Abeler, Johannes & Falk, Armin & Kosse, Fabian, 2021. "Malleability of Preferences for Honesty," IZA Discussion Papers 14304, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022.
"Test Design Under Falsification,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
- Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393136, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393136, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03873972, HAL.
- Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2021. "Test Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 15627, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eduardo Perez-Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Post-Print hal-03873972, HAL.
- Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," Working Papers hal-03393136, HAL.
- César Martinelli & Susan Wendy Parker, 2009.
"Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(4), pages 886-908, June.
- Cesar Martinelli & Susan W. Parker, 2006. "Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program," Working Papers 0602, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- César Martinelli & Susan W. Parker, 2006. "Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000120, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Cesar Martinelli & Susan W Parker, 2007. "Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000191, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Luca Braghieri, 2023. "Biased Decoding and the Foundations of Communication," CESifo Working Paper Series 10432, CESifo.
- Sutan, Angela & Vranceanu, Radu, 2016.
"Lying about delegation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 29-40.
- Sutan, Angela & Vranceanu, Radu, 2015. "Lying about Delegation," ESSEC Working Papers WP1502, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Angela Sutan & Radu Vranceanu, 2015. "Lying about Delegation," Working Papers hal-01109345, HAL.
- Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
- Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2012.
"Truth-Telling: A Representative Assessment,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6919, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- J Abeler & A Becker & A Falk, 2012. "Truth-telling - A Representative Assessment," Discussion Papers 2012-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen, 2024. "Manipulation and obfuscation of financial reports," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1-2), pages 276-296, January.
- Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 384, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2012.
- Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2016.
"Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2016/07, European University Institute.
- Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Feri, Francesco, 2016. "Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Regulating False Discloure," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168159, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2014. "Believing when Credible: Talking about Future Plans," Vienna Economics Papers 1409, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022.
"A reputation for honesty,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
- Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan, 2011.
"Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 244-261, September.
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Discussion Paper 2010-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2019.
"The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 55-76, February.
- Battaglini, Marco & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi & Lai, Ernest, 2016. "The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11356, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K & Wooyoung Lim & Joseph Tao-yi Wang, 2016. "The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 1601, National Taiwan University, Department of Economics, revised May 2016.
- Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2015.
"On Education and Democratic Preferences,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 362-388, November.
- Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2009. "Education and Democratic Preferences," Research Department Publications 4627, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Gradstein, Mark & Chong, Alberto E., 2009. "Education and Democratic Preferences," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1650, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012.
"The Credit Ratings Game,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.
- Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2009. "The Credit Ratings Game," NBER Working Papers 14712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2010. "The credit ratings game," Economics Working Papers 1221, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2009. "The credit ratings game," Economics Working Papers 1149, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Patrick Bolton & Joel Shapiro & Xavier Freixas, 2015. "The Credit Ratings Game," Working Papers 468, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Wang, Bo & Zheng, Suli, 2023. "Public information manipulation in the financial market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
- Pinghan Liang, 2013.
"Exit and Voice: A Game-theoretic Analysis of Customer Complaint Management,"
Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 177-207, May.
- Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Exit and voice: a game-theoretic analysis of customer complaint management," MPRA Paper 45268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
- Sebastiano Della Lena, 2019. "Non-Bayesian Social Learning and the Spread of Misinformation in Networks," Working Papers 2019:09, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.
- Guiso, Luigi & Pozzi, Andrea & Tsoy, Anton & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2022.
"The cost of steering in financial markets: Evidence from the mortgage market,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1209-1226.
- Pozzi, Andrea & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio & Guiso, Luigi & Tsoy, Anton & Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2018. "The Cost of Steering in Financial Markets: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 12115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Leonardo Gambacorta & Luigi Guiso & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli & Andrea Pozzi & Anton Tsoy, 2019. "The Cost of Steering in Financial Markets: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1252, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Leonardo Gambacorta & Luigi Guiso & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli & Andrea Pozzi & Anton Tsoy, 2019. "The cost of steering in financial markets: evidence from the mortgage market," BIS Working Papers 835, Bank for International Settlements.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018.
"Coordination with communication under oath,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-649, September.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Working Papers halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Post-Print halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2015. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01184231, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2015. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01232565, HAL.
- Bo, Wang & Suli, Zheng, 2023. "Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Other publications TiSEM 4b2421f3-f39c-4012-afef-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bertomeu, Jeremy & Marinovic, Iván & Terry, Stephen J. & Varas, Felipe, 2022. "The dynamics of concealment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 227-246.
- de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015.
"Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
- Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2015. "Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Baumann, Florian & Rasch, Alexander, 2017.
"Injunctions against false advertising,"
VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking
168142, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Baumann, Florian & Rasch, Alexander, 2019. "Injunctions against false advertising," DICE Discussion Papers 314, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2019.
- Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2020.
"Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 368-381.
- Antonio Cabrales & Francesco Feri & Piero Gottardi & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2018. "Can there be a Market for Cheap-Talk Information? An Experimental Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 6975, CESifo.
- Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009.
"Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
- Kovac, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2006. "Stochastic Mechanisms in Settings without Monetary Transfers: Regular Case," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 23/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019.
"Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
- Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 490, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," Papers 1908.05556, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014.
"Smooth, strategic communication,"
VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy
100333, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2014. "Smooth, strategic communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 10190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024.
"Organizing Data Analytics,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2024. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008.
"Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frederic Koessler, 2005. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," THEMA Working Papers 2005-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754297, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Post-Print halshs-00754297, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019.
"Preferences for Truth‐Telling,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," CESifo Working Paper Series 6087, CESifo.
- Abeler, Johannes & Nosenzo, Daniele & Raymond, Collin, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," IZA Discussion Papers 10188, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for truth-telling," Discussion Papers 2016-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Blau, Benjamin M. & DeLisle, Jared R. & Price, S. McKay, 2015. "Do sophisticated investors interpret earnings conference call tone differently than investors at large? Evidence from short sales," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 203-219.
- Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013.
"Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms and the Role of Consumer Protection,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(3), pages 1002-1026.
- Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Sales Talk, Cancellation Terms, and the Role of Consumer Protection," Working Papers 465, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Besancenot, Damien & Dubart, Delphine & Vranceanu, Radu, 2013.
"The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 239-247.
- Besancenot, Damien & Dubart, Delphine & Vranceanu, Radu, 2012. "The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information," ESSEC Working Papers WP1207, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Damien Besancenot & Delphine Dubart & Radu Vranceanu, 2012. "The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information," Working Papers hal-00692139, HAL.
- Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2021. "Rollover risk and stress test credibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 370-399.
- Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016.
"Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Ganglmair, Bernhard & Tschantz, Steven, 2016. "Adversarial decision-making: Choosing between models constructed by interested parties," MPRA Paper 71501, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya‐Martinez, 2019.
"Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 298-315, April.
- Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, New Economic School (NES).
- Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Michael Spezio & Colin F. Camerer, 2010. "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 984-1007, June.
- Federico Vaccari, 2023.
"Influential news and policy-making,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1363-1418, November.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2020. "Influential News and Policy-making," MPRA Paper 100464, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Influential News and Policy-making," FEEM Working Papers 329584, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Federico Vaccari, 2022. "Influential News and Policy-making," Working Papers 2022.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Influential News and Policy-making," Papers 2108.11177, arXiv.org.
- Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023.
"Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
- Armenak Antinyan & Luca Corazzini & Elena D'Agostino & Filippo Pavesi, 2017. "Watch your Words: an Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation," Working Papers 18/2017, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- Armenak Antinyan & Luca Corazzini & Elena D'Agostino & Filippo Pavesi, 2019. "Watch your Words: An Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation," Working Papers 2019: 31, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Alistair Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 461, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2012.
- Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
- Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
- Dahjin Kim & Gechun Lin & Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2024. "Informative campaigns, overpromising, and policy bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(4), pages 344-366, October.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
- repec:cgr:cgsser:06-02 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dziuda, Wioletta, 2011. "Strategic argumentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1362-1397, July.
- Kai Barron & Tilman Fries, 2023.
"Narrative Persuasion,"
Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series
469, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Barron, Kai & Fries, Tilman, 2024. "Narrative persuasion," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2023-301r, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Fries, Tilman & Barron, Kai, 2023. "Narrative Persuasion," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277691, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Kai Barron & Tilman Fries, 2024. "Narrative Persuasion," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0039, Berlin School of Economics.
- Barron, Kai & Fries, Tilman, 2023. "Narrative persuasion," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2023-301, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Kai Barron & Tilman Fries, 2023. "Narrative Persuasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 10206, CESifo.
- Damien Besancenot & Delphine Dubart & Radu Vranceanu, 2012.
"The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information,"
Working Papers
hal-00690409, HAL.
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CEPR Discussion Papers
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"Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1841-1861.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
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Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
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