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The spread of misinformation in networks with individual and social learning

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  • Della Lena, Sebastiano

Abstract

The paper studies the spread of misinformation when agents have both individual and social learning. In the presence of sources of misinformation, the most vulnerable and harmful agents are those with poor individual learning and high centrality in the network. However, if opinions are polarized, providing some agents with better private information can backfire on other agents. Moreover, the incentives to spread misinformation have an inverted U-shaped relationship with the spreader’s influence; and, under certain conditions, an unaware spreader can be more harmful than a purposeful one. Overall, this paper warns that any policy that fails to consider both the precision of agents’ private information and the network structure runs the risk of backfiring.

Suggested Citation

  • Della Lena, Sebastiano, 2024. "The spread of misinformation in networks with individual and social learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:168:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124001338
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104804
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Misinformation; Opinion dynamics; Non-Bayesian social learning; Stubborn agents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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