Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Rules
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- Caselli, Francesco & Cunningham, Tom & Morelli, Massimo & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2012. "Signalling, incumbency advantage, and optimal reelection rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121757, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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- Brollo, Fernanda & Troiano, Ugo, 2013. "What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 161, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
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- Luigi Guiso & Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli, 2016. "Cultural Differences and Institutional Integration," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Guiso, Luigi & Morelli, Massimo & Herrera, Helios, 2013. "A Cultural Clash View of the EU Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 9679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Supermajority; incumbency advantage; signalling;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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