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Information manipulation and majority rule

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  • Wang, Bo
  • Zheng, Suli

Abstract

This paper studies endogenous institution in the presence of information manipulation. We show majority rule discourages information manipulation, reducing Type II errors in collective decision-making. In equilibrium, the optimal majority rule strategically balances the reduction in Type II errors associated with discouraging information manipulation with the potential increase in Type I errors. When it comes to green environmental issues, member countries often adopt a majority rule voting system. This is because these issues typically involve high inherent risks that affect all countries on a global scale, and low heterogeneity among members in terms of the desire to address these challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Bo & Zheng, Suli, 2024. "Information manipulation and majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 242(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:242:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524003082
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111824
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information manipulation; Majority rule; Decision-making;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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