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Coordination with communication under oath

Author

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  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Stéphane Luchini

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jason F Shogren

    (UW - University of Wyoming)

  • Adam Zylbersztejn

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01480525, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01480525
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirchsteiger, Georg & Legros, Patrick & Aghadadashli, Hamid, 2021. "Cheap Talk is not Cheap: Free versus Costly Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 15843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 426-438, January.
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    4. Fluet, Claude & Galbiati, Rpbertp, 2016. "Lois et normes : les enseignements de l'économie comportementale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 191-215, Mars-Juin.
    5. Attallah, May & Abildtrup, Jens & Stenger, Anne, 2022. "Non-monetary incentives for sustainable biomass harvest: An experimental approach," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 479-504, July.
    7. Sorravich Kingsuwankul & Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping," Working Papers hal-04209489, HAL.
    8. Yan Chen & Catherine Eckel, 2018. "Introduction to the Symposium in Experimental Economics in memory of John Van Huyck," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 481-486, September.
    9. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2024. "Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: Experimental evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-04722343, HAL.
    10. Niu, Xiaofei & Li, Jianbiao, 2020. "Incentivizing organ donation by swearing an oath: The role of signature and ritual," EconStor Preprints 203243, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, revised 2020.
    11. Hildreth, John Angus D., 2024. "When loyalty binds: Examining the effectiveness of group versus personal loyalty calls on followers’ compliance with leaders’ unethical requests," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    12. Grüner Sven, 2020. "Sample Size Calculation in Economic Experiments," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 240(6), pages 791-823, December.
    13. J. Jobu Babin & Haritima S. Chauhan, 2023. "Show no quarter: combating plausible lies with ex-ante honesty oaths," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 66-76, June.
    14. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Page, Lionel & Dulleck, Uwe, 2015. "Promoting pro-social behavior with public statements of good intent," MPRA Paper 80072, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 May 2017.
    15. Leah H. Palm-Forster & Paul J. Ferraro & Nicholas Janusch & Christian A. Vossler & Kent D. Messer, 2019. "Behavioral and Experimental Agri-Environmental Research: Methodological Challenges, Literature Gaps, and Recommendations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 719-742, July.
    16. Olivier Armantier & Charles Holt, 2024. "Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured? An Experimental Investigation," Staff Reports 1103, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    17. Vaz, João & Shogren, Jason, 2023. "Cooperation under oath: A case for context-dependent preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    18. Ann-Kathrin Koessler & Lionel Page & Uwe Dulleck, 2021. "Public cooperation statements," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 747-767, October.
    19. Gruener, Sven, 2018. "Sample size calculations in economic RCTs: following clinical studies?," SocArXiv 43zbg, Center for Open Science.
    20. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & James Murphy & Jason F. Shogren, 2019. "Lying and Shirking Under Oath," Working Papers 19-19, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
      • Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & James J. Murphy & Jason F. Shogren, 2019. "Lying and Shirking Under Oath," Working Papers 2019-02, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
    21. Brent J. Davis & Tarek Jaber‐Lopez, 2023. "Do voluntary commitment mechanisms improve welfare? The effect of mandatory and voluntary oaths in a social dilemma," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 525-540, April.
    22. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00879205 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Tobias Beck, 2020. "Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202030, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    24. Beck, Tobias, 2021. "How the honesty oath works: Quick, intuitive truth telling under oath," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coordination game; Cheap talk communication; Oath;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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