Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13178
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006.
"Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.
- Rabah Amir & Anna Stepanova, 2000. "Second-Mover Advantage and Price Leadership in Bertrand Duopoly," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- AMIR, Rabah & STEPANOVA, Anna, 2004. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
- Rabin Matthew, 1994.
"A Model of Pre-game Communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 370-391, August.
- Matthew Rabin., 1991. "A Model of Pre-Game Communication," Economics Working Papers 91-164, University of California at Berkeley.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1991. "A Model of Pre-Game Communication," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt902697n7, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
- David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
- Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
- David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990.
"Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
- Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2009.
"Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 1125-1147.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Suetens, S., 2006. "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Other publications TiSEM 7620271d-3075-48ed-b03b-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Suetens, S., 2009. "Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes," Other publications TiSEM 694e692f-f551-421e-8cf0-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Suetens, S., 2006. "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Discussion Paper 2006-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Ledyard, John O., "undated".
"Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,"
Working Papers
861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- J. Ledyard, 1997. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Levine's Working Paper Archive 509, David K. Levine.
- John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 May 1994.
- Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996.
"Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 186-197, April.
- Hurkens, S., 1993. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Other publications TiSEM 07474a9e-2329-4384-9e00-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hurkens, S., 1993. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Discussion Paper 1993-19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hurkens, S., 1993. "Multi-Sided Pre-Play Communication By Burning Money," Papers 9319, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 73-107, January.
- van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999.
"Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
- Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Economics Working Papers 190, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Other publications TiSEM 69b18274-5c68-4723-a5e9-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Discussion Paper 1996-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1980.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role Of Investment In Entry-Deterrence," Economic Research Papers 269038, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Rabah Amir, 2005.
"Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economics: An Elementary Survey,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 636-660, January.
- AMIR, Rabah, 2003. "Supermodularity and complementarity in economics: an elementary survey," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003104, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- AMIR, Rabah, 2005. "Supermodularity and complementarity in economics: an elementary survey," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Richard A. Hunt & Mathew L. A. Hayward, 2018. "Value Creation Through Employer Loans: Evidence of Informal Lending to Employees at Small, Labor-Intensive Firms," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(2), pages 284-303, April.
- Ui, Takashi, 2016. "Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 139-146.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984.
"Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- George J Mailath, 2019. "Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 10981, December.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
- Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2019.
"Truth Telling Under Oath,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 426-438, January.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason Shogren, 2015. "Truth-telling under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01224135, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2018. "Truth-telling under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01984653, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F Shogren, 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02018089, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F Shogren, 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02018089, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2015. "Truth-telling under Oath," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15068, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F Shogren, 2019. "Truth Telling Under Oath," Post-Print halshs-02018089, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Julie Rosaz & Jason F. Shogren, 2018. "Truth-telling under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01984653, HAL.
- Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007.
"An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October.
- Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1992.
"Communication in Coordination Games,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 739-771.
- COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Judd B. Kessler & Stephen Leider, 2012. "Norms and Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 62-77, January.
- Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2014. "Representative evidence on lying costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 96-104.
- Navin Kartik, 2009.
"Strategic Communication with Lying Costs,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
- Navin Kartik, 2008. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," 2008 Meeting Papers 350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2010.
"Monotone comparative statics for games with strategic substitutes,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 793-806, September.
- Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2005. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Games with Strategic Substitutes," MPRA Paper 4709, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Sep 2007.
- Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2009. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Games With Strategic Substitutes," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31558, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Sunanda Roy & Tarun Sabarwal, 2008. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Games With Strategic Substitutes," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200810, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised May 2010.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012.
"Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1759-1772.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments," DICE Discussion Papers 65, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Miettinen, Topi, 2013.
"Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 68-84.
- Topi Miettinen, 2006. "Promises and Conventions - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
- Ghemawat, Pankaj, 1984. "Capacity Expansion in the Titanium Dioxide Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 145-163, December.
- Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 488-505, May.
- Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009.
"Dynamic psychological games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1991.
"Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1085-1102, September.
- John Haltiwanger, 1987. "Responders Versus Nonresponders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity," UCLA Economics Working Papers 436, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
- Tore Ellingsen & Robert Östling, 2010.
"When Does Communication Improve Coordination?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1695-1724, September.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2007. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 680, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 13 Oct 2009.
- Boccard, Nicolas & Wauthy, Xavier, 2004. "Bertrand competition and Cournot outcomes: a correction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 163-166, August.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
- Chung, Bobby W. & Wood, Daniel H., 2019. "Threats and promises in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 37-50.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996.
"A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Economics Discussion Papers 10019, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 571-599, May.
- Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2009.
"Bilateral commitment,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1817-1831, July.
- Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12160, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Bilateral Commitment," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/20, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Sophie Bade & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," Working Papers 2006.75, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2006-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988.
"A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-569, May.
- J. Tirole & E. Maskin, 1982. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large-Fixed Costs," Working papers 320, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2010. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 397, David K. Levine.
- Gneezy, Uri & Rockenbach, Bettina & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2013. "Measuring lying aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 293-300.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Corrigendum to 'A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III, Cournot Competition' (vol. 31, no. 4)," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1567-1568, September.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
- V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
- Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
- Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
- Emiliano Catonini, 2021. "Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 610-642.
- Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 366-376, April.
- David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Miettinen, Topi, 2013.
"Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 68-84.
- Topi Miettinen, 2006. "Promises and Conventions - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016.
"Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment,"
Working Papers
P181, FERDI.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers halshs-01332058, HAL.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers 201612, CERDI.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers P181, FERDI.
- Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano, 2021. "Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 235-263, September.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018.
"Coordination with communication under oath,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-649, September.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Working Papers halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Post-Print halshs-01480525, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2015. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01184231, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2015. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Post-Print halshs-01232565, HAL.
- Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.
- Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Ilkka Leppänen, 2017. "Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(2), pages 261-285, June.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019.
"Preferences for Truth‐Telling,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for truth-telling," Discussion Papers 2016-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," CESifo Working Paper Series 6087, CESifo.
- Abeler, Johannes & Nosenzo, Daniele & Raymond, Collin, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," IZA Discussion Papers 10188, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017.
"Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
- Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2011. "Pre-Play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," ECON - Working Papers 034, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2014.
- Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2016. "Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction," CESifo Working Paper Series 5958, CESifo.
- Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2015.
"Commitment in alternating offers bargaining,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 12-18.
- Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
- Siyu Wang & Timothy Flannery, 2021. "Intention or Request: The Impact of Message Structures," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, February.
- López-Pérez, Raúl, 2009. "The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
- Wang, Siyu & Houser, Daniel, 2019. "Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 381-395.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015.
"Industrial Organization,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, September.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978, January.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2014. "Market power and regulation (scientific background)," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Ilkka Leppänen, 2020. "Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 783-799, April.
- Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler, 2024.
"Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 232-258, August.
- Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler, 2018. "Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," TWI Research Paper Series 112, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Dvorak, Fabian & Fehrler, Sebastian, 2018. "Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 11897, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Dutta, Rohan & Ishii, Ryosuke, 2016. "Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 699-727.
- Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:62:y:2024:i:1:p:308-328. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.