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Correlated Information and Mechanism Design
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Cited by:
- , & ,, 2015.
"Implementation with interdependent valuations,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001242, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
- Bentley W. MacLeod, 2003.
"Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March.
- Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000036, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003.
"Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas, 1999. "Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-18, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade," Papers 99-71, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-71, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Song, Yangwei, 2018. "Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 693-726.
- Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 104-123, April.
- Michael Peters, 1997. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Working Papers peters-97-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2011.
"On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Laurent Lamy, 2013.
"“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 194-214, June.
- Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," Post-Print halshs-00840844, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2013. ""Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00840844, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2000.
"Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated,"
Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 54(2), April.
- KLINGER MONTEIRO, Paulo, 1997. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1999. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," Microeconomics 9901003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jan 1999.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002.
"Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, "undated". "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," CARESS Working Papres 99-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, "undated". "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, Penn Economics Department.
- Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007.
"Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August.
- Ronald M. Harstad & Vlad Mares, 2005. "Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly," Working Papers 0515, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Dobzinski, Shahar & Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert, 2015. "Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 349-369.
- Gershkov, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2009.
"Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 36-68, January.
- Alex Gershkov & Balazs Szentes, 2004. "Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 122247000000000311, www.najecon.org.
- M. Martin Boyer & Patrick González, 2001. "Compensation and Auditing with Correlated Information," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-59, CIRANO.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe, 1998. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 144-166, September.
- Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti & Benefetto Gui, 2017. "Inefficient Rationing With Post-Contractual Information," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0214, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Obara Ichiro, 2008.
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
- Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012.
"Contracts between Legal Persons [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Kornhauser, Lewis A. & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," IZA Discussion Papers 5352, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2010. "Contracts between Legal Persons," NBER Working Papers 16049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Neeman, Zvika, 2003. "The effectiveness of English auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 214-238, May.
- Fu, Hu & Haghpanah, Nima & Hartline, Jason & Kleinberg, Robert, 2021. "Full surplus extraction from samples," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Parreiras, Sergio O., 2005. "Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 210-217, August.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2001.
"Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 219-240, August.
- Giuseppe Lopomo, 1995. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Working Papers 95-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- , & , & ,, 2006.
"Topologies on types,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on Types," Scholarly Articles 3160489, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994.
"Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
- Aldo Rustichini, 1992. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Csapó, Gergely & Müller, Rudolf, 2013.
"Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 229-242.
- Csapó, G. & Müller, R.J., 2012. "Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good," Research Memorandum 037, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Reiche, Sönje Kerrin, 2003. "Dynamic Yardstick Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009.
"Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2006. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754397, HAL.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," Post-Print halshs-00754397, HAL.
- Bali, Valentina & Jackson, Matthew, 2002. "Asymptotic Revenue Equivalence in Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 161-176, September.
- Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2009.
"A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 477-489, June.
- Tilman Borgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000147, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000171, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Borgers, Tilman & Norman, Peter, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Microeconomics.ca working papers norman-05-02-08-08-39-42, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 23 Jun 2005.
- Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Chari, V.V. & Golosov, Mikhail & Tsyvinski, Aleh, 2012.
"Prizes and patents: Using market signals to provide incentives for innovations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 781-801.
- V. V. Chari & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations," Working Papers 673, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- V. V. Chari & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000398, David K. Levine.
- Domenico Menicucci, 1998. "Optimal auctions under collusion of buyers with discrete valuations," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 21(1), pages 49-71, June.
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2021. "Uncertainty in Mechanism Design," Papers 2108.12633, arXiv.org.
- Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2021.
"Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications,"
Papers
2107.00640, arXiv.org.
- Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2022. "Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications," Working Papers halshs-03735747, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Konrad Mierendorff, 2022. "Auction Design with Data-Driven Misspecifications," PSE Working Papers halshs-03735747, HAL.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001.
"Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-1259, September.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-74, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Jéhiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Efficient design with interdependent valuations," Papers 99-74, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Fernando Branco, 1996. "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 283-309, December.
- Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2014.
"Beliefs, payoffs, information: On the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 136-153.
- Alia Gizatulina & Martin Hellwig, 2011. "Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_28, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013.
"Information concentration in common value environments,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
- Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2008. "Information Concentration in Common Value Environments," Working papers 2012-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003.
"Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 410-433, November.
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Jan 2003.
- Robert Shimer & Ivan Werning, 2019.
"Efficiency and information transmission in bilateral trading,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 154-176, July.
- Robert Shimer & Iván Werning, 2015. "Efficiency and Information Transmission in Bilateral Trading," NBER Working Papers 21495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Soenje Reiche, 2003. "Dynamic Yardstick Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 459, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Neeman, Zvika, 2004.
"The relevance of private information in mechanism design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
- Neeman, Z., 1998. "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers 93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006.
"On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, January.
- Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series dp350, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Suresh Radhakrishnan & Bin Srinidhi, 2005. "Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and Profitability," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-45, January.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Jacques Crémer & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2003.
"Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 281-310, October.
- d ASPREMONT, Claude & CRÉMER, Jacques & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2003. "Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ronald M Harstad, 2011. "Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0816, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Lee, Yoon-Ho Alex & Klerman, Daniel, 2016. "The Priest-Klein hypotheses: Proofs and generality," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-76.
- Block, Michael K. & Parker, Jeffrey S., 2004. "ecision making in the absence of successful fact finding: theory and experimental evidence on adversarial versus inquisitorial systems of adjudication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-105, March.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022.
"Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2018. "Uncertainty and Robustness of Surplus Extraction," Papers 1811.01320, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
- Luca Rigotti, 2020. "Uncertainty and Robustness of Surplus Extraction," Working Paper 6902, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022.
"Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2019. "Detectability, Duality, and Surplus Extraction," Papers 1905.12788, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
- Luca Rigotti, 2020. "Detectability, Duality, and Surplus Extraction," Working Paper 6903, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020.
"Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018. "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 133, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Rubinchik, Anna & Wang, Ruqu, 2008. "A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 447-452, June.
- Christian Laux, 2001. "Delegated Information Acquisition and Capital Budgeting: On the Separation of Project Evaluation and Project Management," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 591-607, December.
- Anke S. Kessler, 2004. "Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(2), pages 210-231, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R., 2013. "Auctions with a profit sharing contract," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 247-270.
- M. Boyer & Patrick González, 2004.
"Optimal audit policies with correlated types,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 325-334, August.
- M. Martin Boyer & Patrick Gonzalez, 2000. "Optimal Audit Policies with Correlated Types," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1514, Econometric Society.
- John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002.
"Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
- Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019.
"The bidder exclusion effect,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 93-120, March.
- Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2014. "The Bidder Exclusion Effect," NBER Working Papers 20523, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio, 2012.
"Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 152-167.
- Yukio Koriyama & Peter Gruner, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Post-Print hal-00689774, HAL.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Robust Mechanism Design,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
- Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore & Reisinger, Markus, 2021.
"Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
- Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo & Markus Reisinger, 2018. "Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure," CSEF Working Papers 509, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Reisinger, Markus & Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2020. "Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 15472, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore & Reisinger, Markus, 2019. "Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203651, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sergei Severinov & Grigory Kosenok, 2004. "Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the," 2004 Meeting Papers 633, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, April.
- Krajbich, Ian & Camerer, Colin & Rangel, Antonio, 2017. "Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 49-62.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018. "Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 291-317.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2020.
"A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 47-74, March.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2020. "A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability," Post-Print halshs-02138605, HAL.
- Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2014. "Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 248-263.
- Baron, David P. & Meirowitz, Adam, 2001. "Relations between Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models," Research Papers 1711, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
- Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Delayed Verification Mechanism for Dynamic Implementation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Koppl, Thorsten V. & Monnet, Cyril, 2007. "Guess what: It's the settlements! Vertical integration as a barrier to efficient exchange consolidation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3013-3033, October.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- , & , A., 2007.
"Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
- Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Pierangelo Mori, 2008. "Design of Multidimensional Franchise Auctions by an Ignorant Principal," Working Papers - Economics wp2008_13.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Daniel Danau & Analisa Vinella, 2016.
"On the optimal use of correlated information in contractual design under limited liability,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen)
2016-05, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2018. "On the Optimal Use of Correlated Information in Contractual Design under Limited Liability," CESifo Working Paper Series 6974, CESifo.
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