An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 21/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Anastasios Dosis, 2022.
"On the informed principal model with common values,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 792-825, December.
- Anastasios, Dosis, 2019. "On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values," ESSEC Working Papers WP1905, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Anastasios Dosis, 2019. "On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values ," Working Papers hal-02130454, HAL.
- Mostafa Beshkar & Jee‐Hyeong Park, 2021.
"Dispute Settlement With Second‐Order Uncertainty,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1433-1452, November.
- Mostafa Beshkar & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2019. "Dispute Settlement with Second-Order Uncertainty," Working Paper Series no106, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
- Manitra A. Rakotoarisoa, 2016. "Trade with Endogenous Market Power Under Asymmetric and Incomplete Information," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 423-440, December.
- Takeshi Nishimura, 2019. "Informed Principal Problems in Bilateral Trading," Papers 1906.10311, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
- Eric van Damme & Xu Lang, 2022. "Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information," Papers 2211.06830, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- Jeremy Bertomeu & Davide Cianciaruso, 2018. "Verifiable disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 1011-1044, June.
- Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015.
"Bribing in second-price auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 191-205.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Bribing in second-price auctions," Working Papers WP2011/7, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2015. "Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 280-289.
- Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza, 2019.
"Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 568-593.
- Mohammad Davoodalhosseini, 2017. "Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search," Staff Working Papers 17-15, Bank of Canada.
- Xin Zhao, 2023. "Auction design by an informed seller: A foundation of reserve price signalling," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 1161-1190, August.
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