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Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated

Author

Listed:
  • Paulo Klinger Monteiro

    (IMPA)

Abstract

In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1999. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," Microeconomics 9901003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Jan 1999.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9901003
    Note: Type of Document - Latex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal auction; all-pay auction; correlated signals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D - Microeconomics

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