IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/6973.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)

Author

Listed:
  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie
  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

In this working paper, A. Muthoo’s book “Bargaining Theory with Applications” is discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6973
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6973/1/MPRA_paper_6973.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2001. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 377-411, March.
    4. Mathias Dewatripont, 1988. "Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(3), pages 377-390.
    5. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    7. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
    8. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, October.
    9. David de Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386.
    10. Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 223-247.
    11. Chiu, Y Stephen, 1998. "Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 882-901, September.
    12. Rubinstein, Ariel, 2001. "A theorist's view of experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 615-628, May.
    13. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1993. "Efficient Sequential Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(2), pages 435-461.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zapal, Jan, 2018. "Patience in repeated bargaining: Revisiting Muthoo (1999)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 150-153.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
    3. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    4. Chiu, Y. Stephen & Rachel Yang, B., 1999. "The outside option, threat point, and Nash bargaining solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 181-188, February.
    5. Kvaløy, Ola, 2008. "Do norms matter for firm boundaries?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 969-975, June.
    6. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 92-107.
    7. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
    8. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    9. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2020. "Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 514-532.
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 13204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
    12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
    13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 336-339.
    14. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
    15. Armando Gomes, "undated". "Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    16. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
    17. Matouschek, Niko, 2002. "Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3216, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    19. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    20. Chatterjee Kalyan & Chiu Y. Stephen, 2007. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6973. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.