The Priest-Klein hypotheses: Proofs and generality
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2016.06.002
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- K - Law and Economics
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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