IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04311623.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sharing the ownership in Peru and Mexico: The case of a French MNE prompting the SDGs achieveme

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Aubert

    (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon, AMU IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Aix-en-Provence - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)

  • Miguel Ignacio Cordova

    (PUCP - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú = Pontifical Catholic University of Peru)

  • Gonzalo Hernandez

    (ITESO - Universidad Jesuita de Guadalajara)

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to investigate how a French multinational enterprise (MNE) is developing employee stock ownership (ESO) in its subsidiaries in Peru and Mexico, both Latin American countries with deep social and economic inequalities. Design/methodology/approach This is a qualitative case study which conducted interviews with representatives of the French MNE and its subsidiaries in Peru and Mexico. Findings The employee stock purchase plans offered by the company to its employees support the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) 1, 8 and 10 in these countries. Social implications The authors argue that MNEs could become flagships in the SDG achievement in emerging economies. Originality/value By contributing to better workplace outcomes and enhanced corporate performance, ESO is in line with SDG 8. ESO also fulfills SDGs 1 and 10 by allowing employees to build up savings and wealth, whose lack is the main source of inequality and poverty. Reciprocity and binary economics theories explain these relationships.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Aubert & Miguel Ignacio Cordova & Gonzalo Hernandez, 2023. "Sharing the ownership in Peru and Mexico: The case of a French MNE prompting the SDGs achieveme," Post-Print hal-04311623, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04311623
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04311623
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04311623/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicolas Aubert, 2008. "Developing an Ownership Culture with Employee Share Purchase Plans: Evidence from France," Zeitschrift fuer Personalforschung. German Journal of Research in Human Resource Management, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 22(2), pages 130-151.
    2. Meulbroek, Lisa, 2005. "Company Stock in Pension Plans: How Costly Is It?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 443-474, October.
    3. Benartzi, Shlomo & Thaler, Richard H & Utkus, Stephen P & Sunstein, Cass R, 2007. "The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 45-79, February.
    4. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2011. "The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, 2010. "Introduction to "Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options"," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 1-37, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Thomas Rapp & Nicolas Aubert, 2011. "Bank Employee Incentives and Stock Purchase Plans Participation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 185-203, December.
    7. M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, April.
    8. Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi & Dan Weltmann & Saehee Kang & Jung Ook Kim & William Castellano, 2022. "Do Employee Share Owners Face Too Much Financial Risk?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(3), pages 716-740, May.
    9. Ashford, Robert, 1996. "Louis Kelso's binary economy," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-53.
    10. Harry Markowitz & Joseph Blasi & Douglas Kruse, 2010. "Employee stock ownership and diversification," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 95-107, April.
    11. Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010. "Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number krus08-1.
    12. Paige Ouimet & Geoffrey Tate, 2020. "Learning from Coworkers: Peer Effects on Individual Investment Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(1), pages 133-172, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nicolas Aubert & Hachmi Ben Ameur & Guillaume Garnotel & Jean‐Luc Prigent, 2018. "Optimal Employee Ownership Contracts Under Ambiguity Aversion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 238-251, January.
    2. Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi & Dan Weltmann & Saehee Kang & Jung Ook Kim & William Castellano, 2022. "Do Employee Share Owners Face Too Much Financial Risk?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(3), pages 716-740, May.
    3. Xavier Hollandts & Nicolas Aubert & Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid & Victor Prieur, 2018. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment," Post-Print halshs-01495427, HAL.
    4. Xavier Hollandts & Nicolas Aubert & Abdelmehdi Abdelhamid & Victor Prieur, 2017. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment," Working Papers halshs-01495427, HAL.
    5. Abdelnour Joseph & Aubert Nicolas & Campa Domenico, 2022. "Does employee ownership decrease agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies [L'actionnariat salarié réduit-il les coûts d'agence? Le cas des entreprises françaises cotées]," Post-Print hal-03723164, HAL.
    6. Park, Heejin & Noh, Jung-Hee & Pedersen, Melissa & Lee, Sora, 2022. "What are the determinants and managerial motivations for employee ownership in retirement pension plans?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    7. Kruse, Douglas L. & Blasi, Joseph & Weltmann, Dan & Kang, Saehee & Kim, Jung Ook & Castellano, William, 2019. "Do Employee Share Owners Face Too Much Financial Risk?," IZA Discussion Papers 12303, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Aubert, Nicolas & Garnotel, Guillaume & Lapied, André & Rousseau, Patrick, 2014. "Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation of management entrenchment vs. reward management," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 423-434.
    9. Nicolas Aubert & Alexander Kern & Xavier Hollandts, 2017. "Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital," Post-Print halshs-01502001, HAL.
    10. Djaoudath Alidou, 2011. "Les augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés en France - Employee Equity Issue:Evidence from France," Working Papers CREGO 1110603, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    11. Jin‐Hyuk Kim & Nick Vikander, 2023. "Commitment and discretion in contracts: theory and evidence from retirement plans," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 461-488, April.
    12. Nicolas Aubert & Niaz Kammoun & Yacine Bekrar, 2018. "Financial decisions of the financially literate," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 39(2), pages 43-91.
    13. Tariq Javed* & Mohd Faizal Basri, 2019. "Employee Ownership and Financial Performance of State-Owned Entities: A Mediating Role of Employee Loyalty," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 5(3), pages 640-645, 03-2019.
    14. Nicolas Aubert & Xavier Hollandts, 2015. "How Shared Capitalism Affects Employee Withdrawal: An Econometric Case Study Of A French-Listed Company," Post-Print halshs-01256759, HAL.
    15. Geert Braam & Erik Poutsma, 2015. "Broad-Based Financial Participation Plans and Their Impact on Financial Performance: Evidence from a Dutch Longitudinal Panel," De Economist, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 177-202, June.
    16. Arnaud Chevalier, 2022. "Does employee ownership improve performance?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 311-311, May.
    17. Hristos Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche & Douglas L. Kruse & T. D. Stanley, 2020. "Is Profit Sharing Productive? A Meta‐Regression Analysis," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 58(2), pages 364-395, June.
    18. Ansgar Richter & Susanne Schrader, 2017. "Levels of Employee Share Ownership and the Performance of Listed Companies in Europe," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 55(2), pages 396-420, June.
    19. Alex Bryson & Lucy Stokes & David Wilkinson, 2023. "Is pupil attainment higher in well-managed schools?," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(1), pages 129-144, January.
    20. Petri Böckerman & Alex Bryson & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2013. "Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 176(4), pages 861-885, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employee stock purchase plan;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04311623. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.