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How Shared Capitalism Affects Employee Withdrawal: An Econometric Case Study Of A French-Listed Company

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Aubert

    (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

  • Xavier Hollandts

    (CRCGM et IFGE - Kedge Business School - Kedge BS - Kedge Business School)

Abstract

The academic literature emphasizes that shared capitalism positively affects employees' attitudes at work. This paper investigates that issue by testing the relationship between shared capitalism and withdrawal behaviors (turnover and absenteeism). Recent literature interprets shared capitalism as a gift exchange between employers and employees. This paper builds on that literature. The analysis, based on an econometric case study, focuses on a five-year panel dataset of more than 800 subsidiaries belonging to a unique French-listed company. Our results show that only long-term shared capitalism translates into better withdrawal behaviors.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Aubert & Xavier Hollandts, 2015. "How Shared Capitalism Affects Employee Withdrawal: An Econometric Case Study Of A French-Listed Company," Post-Print halshs-01256759, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01256759
    DOI: 10.19030/jabr.v31i3.9226
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01256759v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse & Harry M. Markowitz, 2010. "Risk and Lack of Diversification under Employee Ownership and Shared Capitalism," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 105-136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Joseph Blasi & Michael Conte & Douglas Kruse, 1996. "Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance among Public Companies," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(1), pages 60-79, October.
    3. Richard B. Freeman & Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010. "Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 77-103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Sarah Brown & Fathi Fakhfakh & John G. Sessions, 1999. "Absenteeism and Employee Sharing: An Empirical Analysis Based on French Panel Data, 1981–1991," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 52(2), pages 234-251, January.
    5. Kruse, Douglas L. & Freeman, Richard B. & Blasi, Joseph R. (ed.), 2010. "Shared Capitalism at Work," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226056951, August.
    6. Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, 2010. "Introduction to "Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options"," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 1-37, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Thomas Rapp & Nicolas Aubert, 2011. "Bank Employee Incentives and Stock Purchase Plans Participation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 185-203, December.
    8. Nicholas Wilson & Michael J. Peel, 1991. "The Impact on Absenteeism and Quits of Profit-Sharing and other Forms of Employee Participation," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 44(3), pages 454-468, April.
    9. Derek C. Jones & Panu Kalmi & Antti Kauhanen, 2006. "Human Resource Management Policies and Productivity: New Evidence from An Econometric Case Study," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 22(4), pages 526-538, Winter.
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    11. Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010. "Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number krus08-1.
    12. Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi & Richard B. Freeman, 2012. "Does Linking Worker Pay to Firm Performance Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?," NBER Working Papers 17745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employee Ownership; Shared Capitalism; Profit Sharing Turnover Absenteeism;
    All these keywords.

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