IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-01495427.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment

Author

Listed:
  • Xavier Hollandts

    (CRCGM et IFGE - Kedge Business School - Kedge BS - Kedge Business School)

  • Nicolas Aubert

    (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon, AMU IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Aix-en-Provence - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)

  • Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid

    (CleRMa - Clermont Recherche Management - ESC Clermont-Ferrand - École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) - Clermont-Ferrand - UCA [2017-2020] - Université Clermont Auvergne [2017-2020])

  • Victor Prieur

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Employee stock ownership gives employees a voice and therefore may have a major impact on corporate governance. Thus, employee stock ownership may be a powerful mean to protect CEOs from both market for corporate control and dismissal threat. In this paper, we examine the relationship between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Following the recent French legislative changes, we use a comprehensive panel dataset of the major French listed companies over the 2009-2012 period. We document inverted U shaped relationships between employee stock ownership and CEO entrenchment. Board employee ownership representation also plays a role and increases the inflexion points of these curvilinear relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Hollandts & Nicolas Aubert & Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid & Victor Prieur, 2018. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment," Post-Print halshs-01495427, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01495427
    DOI: 10.7202/1058165ar
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01495427v2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01495427v2/document
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.7202/1058165ar?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Huafeng (JASON) Chen & Marcin Kacperczyk & Hernán Ortiz-Molina, 2011. "Do Nonfinancial Stakeholders Affect the Pricing of Risky Debt? Evidence from Unionized Workers," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 347-383.
    2. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    3. Aubert, Nicolas & Garnotel, Guillaume & Lapied, André & Rousseau, Patrick, 2014. "Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation of management entrenchment vs. reward management," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 423-434.
    4. Zied Guedri & Xavier Hollandts, 2008. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on Firm Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 460-474, September.
    5. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    6. Ian Gregory‐Smith & Steve Thompson & Peter W. Wright, 2009. "Fired or Retired? A Competing Risks Analysis of Chief Executive Turnover," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 463-481, March.
    7. Henrik Cronqvist & Fredrik Heyman & Mattias Nilsson & Helena Svaleryd & Jonas Vlachos, 2009. "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 309-339, February.
    8. Faleye, Olubunmi & Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall, 2006. "When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 489-510, September.
    9. Gamble, John E., 2000. "Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 15(5-6), pages 433-447.
    10. Boone, Audra L. & Casares Field, Laura & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Raheja, Charu G., 2007. "The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 66-101, July.
    11. Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M. & Yang, Tina, 2008. "The determinants of board structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 308-328, February.
    12. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    13. Benartzi, Shlomo & Thaler, Richard H & Utkus, Stephen P & Sunstein, Cass R, 2007. "The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 45-79, February.
    14. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    15. Rauh, Joshua D., 2006. "Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover defense?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 379-410, August.
    16. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    17. E. Han Kim & Paige Ouimet, 2014. "Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership: Motives and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(3), pages 1273-1319, June.
    18. Raheja, Charu G., 2005. "Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 283-306, June.
    19. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    20. Viral V. Acharya & Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2011. "The Internal Governance of Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(3), pages 689-720, June.
    21. William Pugh & John Jahera & Sharon Oswald, 1999. "ESOPs, takeover protection, and corporate decision-making," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 23(2), pages 170-183, June.
    22. Kruse, Douglas L. & Freeman, Richard B. & Blasi, Joseph R. (ed.), 2010. "Shared Capitalism at Work," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226056951, September.
    23. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7306 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Wintoki, M. Babajide & Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M., 2012. "Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 581-606.
    25. Charles W. L. Hill & Scott A. Snell, 1988. "External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research‐intensive industries," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(6), pages 577-590, November.
    26. Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011. "Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
    27. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Bermig, Andreas & Dilger, Alexander, 2013. "Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretic analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 51-74.
    28. Fauver, Larry & Fuerst, Michael E., 2006. "Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 673-710, December.
    29. Chaplinsky, Susan & Niehaus, Greg, 1994. "The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Contests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1451-1470, September.
    30. Thomas Rapp & Nicolas Aubert, 2011. "Bank Employee Incentives and Stock Purchase Plans Participation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 40(3), pages 185-203, December.
    31. Chang, Saeyoung & Mayers, David, 1992. "Managerial vote ownership and shareholder wealth *1: Evidence from employee stock ownership plans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 103-131, August.
    32. M. Pagano & P. F. Volpin, 2005. "Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 841-868, April.
    33. Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January.
    34. Julian Atanassov & E. Han Kim, 2009. "Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 341-374, February.
    35. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    36. Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010. "Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number krus08-1.
    37. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mehdi Nekhili & Amal Boukadhaba & Haithem Nagati, 2021. "The ESG–financial performance relationship: Does the type of employee board representation matter?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 134-161, March.
    2. Abdelnour Joseph & Aubert Nicolas & Campa Domenico, 2022. "Does employee ownership decrease agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies [L'actionnariat salarié réduit-il les coûts d'agence? Le cas des entreprises françaises cotées]," Post-Print hal-03723164, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xavier Hollandts & Nicolas Aubert & Abdelmehdi Abdelhamid & Victor Prieur, 2017. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment," Working Papers halshs-01495427, HAL.
    2. Nicolas Aubert & Alexander Kern & Xavier Hollandts, 2017. "Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital," Post-Print halshs-01502001, HAL.
    3. Aubert, Nicolas & Kern, Alexander & Hollandts, Xavier, 2017. "Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital11We are grateful to the Editor in Chief, Thomas Lagoarde-Segot and to participants at 2016 French accounting association conference, 2015 French financ," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 67-78.
    4. Xavier Hollandts & Zied Guedri & Nicolas Aubert, 2011. "Les déterminants de la représentation des actionnaires salariés au Conseil d’administration ou de surveillance," Post-Print halshs-01256775, HAL.
    5. Abdelnour Joseph & Aubert Nicolas & Campa Domenico, 2022. "Does employee ownership decrease agency costs? Evidence from French listed companies [L'actionnariat salarié réduit-il les coûts d'agence? Le cas des entreprises françaises cotées]," Post-Print hal-03723164, HAL.
    6. Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011. "Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
    7. Park, Heejin & Noh, Jung-Hee & Pedersen, Melissa & Lee, Sora, 2022. "What are the determinants and managerial motivations for employee ownership in retirement pension plans?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    8. Aubert, Nicolas & Garnotel, Guillaume & Lapied, André & Rousseau, Patrick, 2014. "Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation of management entrenchment vs. reward management," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 423-434.
    9. Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan, 2021. "The effect of board composition and managerial pay on Saudi firm performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 693-758, August.
    10. Fareeha Waseem & Syeda Fizza Abbas & Anum Farooq, 2022. "Nexus of Employee Stock Ownership with Cost of Capital: Evidence from KSE 100," iRASD Journal of Management, International Research Alliance for Sustainable Development (iRASD), vol. 4(1), pages 38-50, March.
    11. Nicolas Aubert & Hachmi Ben Ameur & Guillaume Garnotel & Jean‐Luc Prigent, 2018. "Optimal Employee Ownership Contracts Under Ambiguity Aversion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 238-251, January.
    12. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, January.
    13. Djaoudath Alidou, 2011. "Les augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés en France - Employee Equity Issue:Evidence from France," Working Papers CREGO 1110603, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    14. Tahir Akhtar & Mohammad Ali Tareq & Kashif Rashid, 2021. "Chief Executive Officers’ monitoring, board effectiveness, managerial ownership, and cash holdings: evidence from ASEAN," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(8), pages 2193-2238, November.
    15. James, Hui Liang & Borah, Nilakshi & Lirely, Roger, 2022. "The effectiveness of board independence in high-discretion firms," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 103-117.
    16. Đặng, Rey & Houanti, L’Hocine & Reddy, Krishna & Simioni, Michel, 2020. "Does board gender diversity influence firm profitability? A control function approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 168-181.
    17. Zied Guedri & Xavier Hollandts, 2008. "Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on Firm Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 460-474, September.
    18. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5892 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Akbar, Saeed & Kharabsheh, Buthiena & Poletti-Hughes, Jannine & Shah, Syed Zulfiqar Ali, 2017. "Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 101-110.
    20. Hélène Cardoni, 2020. "Contribution to the knowledge of the impact of employee share ownership on corporate governance [Contribution à la connaissance de l'impact de l'actionnariat salarié sur la gouvernance des entrepri," Post-Print halshs-02556417, HAL.
    21. Sofi Mohd Fikri & Mohamed Hisham Yahya & Taufiq Hassan, 2017. "A Review on Agency Cost of Shariah Governance in Mutual Fund," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(1), pages 530-538.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO entrenchment; employee stock ownership; corporate governance;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01495427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.