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Why unions: understanding how unions overcome the free-rider problem

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  • Richard Murphy

Abstract

This paper provides evidence for why individuals join unions instead of free-riding. I model membership as legal insurance. To test the model, I use the incidence of news stories concerning allegations against teachers in the UK as a plausibly exogenous shock to demand for such insurance. I find that, for every five stories occurring in a region, teachers are 2.2 percentage points more likely to be members in the subsequent year. These effects are larger when teachers share characteristics with the news story and can explain 45 percent of the growth in teacher union membership between 1992 and 2010.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Murphy, 2019. "Why unions: understanding how unions overcome the free-rider problem," CEP Discussion Papers dp1625, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1625
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unions; teachers; media; insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions

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